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Purpose of the case study.
In this case study it will be argued that from its start
the semiconductor industry has been considered a strate-
gic industry in the USA receiving government support.
However, advantages erode and last only until competitors
have duplicated or outmaneuvered them. Observing the
excess returns earned in this sector Japanese companies
wanted to shift these excessive returns to Japan and the
Japanese authorities provided support undermining the
initial American competitiveness on the world market by
closing the Japanese market both to imports and foreign
direct investment.
In order to counteract this the US industry reacted by
creating, with government funding, the research consorti-
um SEMATECH and the American authorities responded by
concluding in 1986 a bilateral trade agreement with Japan
in which Japan agreed to voluntarily restrict its exports
of semiconductors and to voluntarily expand the imports
of chips.
The present situation in the global semiconductor indus-
try is that due to the exhorbitant high R&D cost of
developing new generations of semiconductors the large
producers all over the world are forming strategic alli-
ances, implying that according to the Japanese there is
no need to renew the semiconductor trade agreement.
The emergence of successful global alliances has the
potential to shift competition away from the current,
predominantly nationalistic focus to a struggle among
competing global partnerships.
If relationships of this sort prosper, then at least one
Japanese-American trade sore may have healed itself.
This study starts with demonstrating that globalization
is reality in the semiconductor industry. It presents a
survey of the events, its backgrounds and an economic




Since the birth of the semiconductor industry with the
invention of the transistor at Bell laboratories in 1947,
the industry has been characterised by a seemingly never-
ending chain of product and process innovation. The
semiconductor industry is a high-technology industry
where firms allocate a large part of their revenue to
research and development. Semiconductors have found
direct application in almost everything produced and they
are believed to have spurred the development of other
important industries, such as computers, telecommunicati-
ons and consumer electronics. They are considered the oil
of the next century.
The most significant product and technical advances in
microelectronics have been achieved by US companies.
Initially, a combination of factor endowments, technolo-
gical skills and growing demand, all fostered by gover-
ment policies and purchases by the military, gave Ameri-
can companies a competitive edge and first-mover advanta-
ges with a steep learning curve.
Semiconductors have been labeled a strategic industry.
The reasons and criteria for labeling semiconductors a
strategic industry are:
1) the importance of semiconductor components for superi-
or performance in military hardware;
2) the centrality of semiconductor technology for achie-
ving breakthroughs in computers and information-absed
technology.
3) the broad range and versality of semiconductor appli-
cations for large end user industries, including automo-
biles and the service sector;
4) the pivotal position of the semiconductor industry in
the system of institutions and practices underlying a
nation’s capacity to innovate, employment, manufacturing
infrastructure, R&D, graduate training and so forth.
Therefore, the case for semiconductors rests on their
importance in maintaining a nation’s capacity to innovate
and commercialize technology, and all that this implies
for military, industrial, and technological leadership.
Hence, as the semiconductor industry is generating exter-
nalities and spillover effects for other sectors it is
considered to be a strategic sector.
Government promotion of strategic industries is an incre-
asingly common practice because of their connection with
the commercial development of critical technologies. The
traditional rationale for these policies hinges on the
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infant industry argument due to which new industries take
a while to get established because of start up problems
and because the industry needed to be insulated tempora-
rily from competition.
In high-technology industries, particularly those with
high initial R&D costs or those with steep learning
curves, the infant industry argument has been supplemen-
ted with a new rationale taken from strategic trade
theory, arguing that targeting may be desirable under
certain circumstances, especially when there are the
significant spillover effects between the semiconductor
industry and the rest of the economy. These types of
industries offer strong advantages to first movers,
especially if later entry is quite limited. The firm with
the highest cumulative production has the lowest unit
costs and hence can underprice all other competitors and
still make a profit.
Due to spillover effects in critical sectors, like
semiconductors, a country’s gain or loss in competitive
position can result in a cumulative gain or loss across a
whole spectrum of connected industries.
In the presence of such effects in imperfectly competiti-
ve markets government targeting of a single sector can
have profound enduring effects throughout the economy.
Strategic trade theory assumes that competition is imper-
fect (i.e. oligopolistic or monopolistic) and that there
are increasing returns to scale and economies of learning
by doing.
Import protection may act as export promotion. Government
targeting may shift the outcome of the strategic interac-
tion by shifting the excess returns from the foreign in
favor of the domestic firm. Targeting helps national
firms grab as large a piece as possible of the internati-
onal profit pie.
There is nothing new about the conclusion that strategic
government intervention can give home firms larger market
shares and profits. What is new about strategic trade
policies is that this may actually improve the overall
welfare of the home country at others countries’ expense.
Therefore, strategic trade policy aims to shift excess
returns from the foreign country to the domestic economy.
Government intervention as a strategic tool can decisive-
ly shift competitive advantage from one national economy
to another when industrial production is characterized by
dynamic economies of scale, imperfect competition and a
cumulative and territorially embedded knowledge base.
Comparative advantage in this sector is no longer exoge-
nous, it is considered to be endogenous, less a function
of factor endowments, but created by strategic government
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intervention.
The great danger of strategic trade policy is that reta-
liation and protectionism may come about, resulting in a
decrease of world welfare as a whole and in a situation
in which the countries are caught in a Prisoners’ dilem-
ma.
In the USA the government directly and indirectly under-
wrote technology development, both through R&D contracts
and through military procurement. While the significance
of military markets declined during the 1970s, the initi-
al phase of military procurement during the 1960s helped
to secure the technological leadership of US firms in the
semiconductor industry.
However, after three decades of technological and
commercial domination, US semiconductor firms in the
1980s generally lost market share and technological
leadership to Japan. The rise of Japan to market leaders-
hip in high-technology industries is a paradigmatic
example of the positive growth effects of aggressive
government intervention. Through a combination of invest-
ment incentives, coordination of R&D and market closure,
the Japanese government helped to secure the rise of the
Japanese semiconductor industry to market leadership. A
classic strategy of infant-industry protection and promo-
tion in Japan worked to create a competitve Japanese
industry capable of challenging American supremacy.
The popular view is that Japan’s success rests on a
combination of government research subsidies, a protected
domestic market and dumping of semiconductors at below
fair-market-value in the US. The Japanese government
intervened strategically in the market, overcoming the
technological leadership of US firms and shifting compe-
titive advantage away from the US to Japan. In the face
of unfair competition from Japan, US firms were unable to
remain profitable and withdrew from key product markets.
However, this account overemphasizes the role of the
Japanese government and MITI and underestimates the
significance of structural weaknesses in the US semicon-
ductor industry and the superior manufacturing performan-
ce of Japanese semiconductor producers.
MITI sponsored research in the precompetitive Very Large
Scale Integration (VLSI) production in order to enhance
process capability rather than to develop specific pro-
duct technologies and to improve upon manufacturing
equipment bought from US firms.
MITI indeed played a key role in allowing Japanese firms
to catch up to the USA, but the subsequent competitive
success of Japanese firms had more to do with the inter-
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nal development efforts of individual firms and the
superior manufacturing performance of Japanese producers.
By 1986 Japan had surpassed the US as the largest produ-
cer of semiconductors in the world. In 1991, Japanese
companies held 46 percent of the $60 billion world market
for semiconductors and US companies held 39 percent.
With Japanese producers outspending international compe-
titors in R&D and capital equipment, industry observers
warned of a possible domino effect in which US firms
would be driven out of profitable segments of the semi-
conductor industry and other allied high technology
sectors of production such as computers and communicati-
ons systems.
In response, the US semiconductor industry, led by the
Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) conducted a
highly effective lobbying campaign for government sup-
port. The SIA argued that in the absence of a strong
semiconductor industry US defense would become dependent
upon foreign sources of supply for leading-edge semicon-
ductor devices. The US government initiated two programs
of support for the US semiconductor industry:
1) a semiconductor trade agreement with Japan;
2) multiyear financing for a consortium of US semiconduc-
tor firms: SEMATECH.
In the Semiconductor Trade Agreement concluded in 1986
and revised in 1991 the USA and Japan negotiated floor
prices for DRAMs and Japan promised to increase purchases
of semiconductors from US firms.
In 1987 the US government began a new R&D initiative by
providing support to SEMATECH, a consortium of semicon-
ductor firms involved in the development of advanced
semiconductor manufacturing technology. The primary goal
of SEMATECH has been to restore US competitiveness in
semiconductor manufacturing technology.
As a result of these actions, in 1995, US worldwide
semiconductor market share out of $155 billion has achie-
ved again 39.8 percent, while that of Japan is 39.5
percent; South Korea and Taiwan have helped to boost the
share of Asian producers to 12.1 percent; European produ-
cers hold a share of 8.6 percent.
1.1. Globalization of the semiconductor industry .
The last decade the semiconductor industry has gone
through a period of remarkable and far-reaching change.
This $100 billion industry is shifting from a vertically
integrated, monolithic, single nation-based business to a
horizontally integrated, cooperative industry based on
multi-national partnerships and alliances.
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In 1995 the world semiconductor industry generated sales
of approximately $144 billion. The market is growing
rapidly, at about 15% annually, although since the end of
1995 there is a temporary set-back. Sales in 1996 are
expected to total some $155 billion and to reach $270
billion by the year 2000. This growth in semiconductor
sales and trade is the result of growth in demand for
existing products, and the development of new technolo-
gies, appplications, products and markets.
The fastest growing supplier and consumer of semiconduc-
tors is not the US or Japan, but Asia. By 2010, it will
represent above 40% of semiconductor exports. Asia will
also sow the biggest growth in demand for semiconductors.
54% of the North American and 61% of Japanese exports of
integrated circuits will go to Asia in 2010. Of Asian
imports in 2010, almost 47% will be expected to originate
within that region.
It is somewhat misleading to talk of a monolithic semi-
conductor industry, since the industry is composed of
many different sectors, from low-end, simple commodity
semiconductors, to high-end application specific semicon-
ductors. Each sector has its own demand and business
characteristics.
For most world regions, semiconductor trade and sales are
driven by the demand for computer applications, which
include microprocessors and memories. The Japanese end-
use market stands out as somewhat unique, with a strong
consumer goods segment which has traditionally challenged
computer sales. In other regions of the world, it is the
computer market which is the largest user of semiconduc-
tors, taking 62% of sales in the US, 41% in Europe and
52% in the Asia/Pacific region. However, recently the
Japanes market is moving away from consumer-oriented
analog products, towards digital electronics and computer
products. The high-end, computer-based segments are the
fastest growing segments in all regions.
No single measure of the international semiconductor
market tells the whole story. There are different ways of
measuring size and shares of markets, none of which is
perfect. One measure of total market size is total world
exports for semiconductors: $105 billion in 1995. Howe-
ver, this measure excludes the sales of semiconductors
within the market in which they are produced. Another
commonly used measure is the total value of the indus-
try’s sales, which was $144 billion in 1995. However,
this measure does not take into account the captive
market for semiconductors, that is the internal use of
semiconductors in vertically-integrated companies. Each
measure paints a different, but incomplete picture of the
marketplace. These simple sets of dats are further com-
plicated by the complex and dispersed organizations of
production within each firm and the growing inter-relati-
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onships between firms of all nationalities at different
stages of production.
Globalization is reality in the international semiconduc-
tor industry with a significant shift of production and
assembly by US and Japanese firms outside of their res-
pective countries. This globalization trend is reflected
in the continued long-term growth in foreign investment
and changes in international sourcing and in the extensi-
ve formation of alliances. This process is practically
irreversible. US firms are more aggressive than other
semiconductor companies in moving production facilities
offshore in search of lower labour and facility costs,
mainly at the finishing stages of production.
Very different conclusions can be drawn based on whether
the relative importance of individual countries or regi-
ons in the world semiconductor market is measured based
on company ownership or based on export shares. Inter-
relationships between firms have grown to such an extent
that it becomes totally irrelevant to use a single measu-
re to assess market share or the contribution of diffe-
rent countries/regions to the global market. In the
beginning of the industry’s development, market share
measures based on trade or ownership were similar. Howe-
ver, the increased globalization has created a signifi-
cant gap between these two indicators, as is shown in
next table for 1994.
Region by Ownership by Exports





These figures only give a partial view of what is happe-
ning. E.g., Europe’s share of world exports mainly re-
flects the importance of intra-European Union trade.
Surprising is the comparatively low US share of world
exports which is barely half its market share based on
company ownership. This suggests that a very high share
of US production is taking place outside the US, mainly
in Asia. The two regions with the greatest difference are
North America and Asia/Pacific. To a large extent the
difference reflects the same phenomenon: Asia/Pacific
companies export to the world qua share double of what
they own. While this contributes to job creation and
economic growth in the offshore region, it may not neces-
sarily affect jobcreation in the country where the owner
companies are located. Moreover, the US and Japan are
exporting parts for resp. 43% and 20%, which are used in
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offshore labour-intensive manufacturing and this again
provides a partial explanantion for the ownership/trade
data shown above.
International alliances among semiconductor companies
have become the norm. The largest portion of these alli-
ances are between Japanese and US firms. They are being
formed at all stages of production, i.e. from R&D, to
production and distribution. The majority of these are
pre-competitive in nature, i.e. formed at the product
development stage. The increase in global alliances can
be attributed to a few key factors, including a move
toward specialization, the growing cost of R&D, changes
in the geographic distribution of production linked to
different rates of growth of demand across regions, and
to companies’ search for lower cost production bases.
Moreover, semiconductor firms have looked for technologi-
cal complements in areas where they had limited experien-
ce and have sought to gain access to partners’ specific
strengths in resources, such as products, engineering,
technology, finance, customer base, sales forces and/or
distribution.
With respect to the movement toward specialization as a
key factor leading to industry cooperation, e.g., US
companies lead in production of microcomponents and
application specific integrated circuits, while Japanese
firms are strong in memory devices such as SRAMs and
DRAMs and devices geared to consumer-oriented products.
Over 60% of alliances by Japanese firms in emerging Asia
were for the purpose of production cooperation, while 60%
of alliances between Japan - US and Japan - Europe were
for development reasons. The majority of US and European
partners were chosen for their superior technology and/or
products, while Asian partners were chosen for their
production capabilities and/or to help share the financi-
al burden of the production facility investment. Japanese
companies have more alliances with US firms than with any
other economic region, and US companies have more allian-
ces with Japanese companies than any other region. 69% of
all alliances between Japanese and foreign companies were
between Japan - US, 15% Japan - Europe and 13% Japan -
Emerging Asia. The number of alliances with emerging Asia
is set to grow as the industry in this region develops
further.
As the cost of semiconductor R&D has grown dramatically
cooperation and the pooling of financial resources are
essential. In the 1970s, total R&D and capital expenditu-
res did not exceed 30% of sales. By 1992, this figure had
climbed to 40%, divided equally between R&D and capital
expense. Next table illustrates the growing cost of R&D
in the development of DRAMs since 1985.
1985 256 K $ 110 million
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1988 1 M 250
1990 4 M 400
1994 16 M 850
1995 64 - 256 M 1000
< 2000 1 G > 1000
Source: DRI/MCGraw-Hill.
Another reason for alliances is that in order to maintain
market share firms must permanently adjust to changing
customer needs. As the main markets for conventional
consumer electronic products such as stereos and VCRs
have become saturated, consumer electronic firms see
their customer base shift to information technology,
equipment and multimedia.
In addition to supplier-supplier alliances, the industry
is now witnessing an increasing proliferation of global
design-in projects between suppliers and users of diffe-
rent nationalities. Design-ins refer to the practice of
designing semiconductor devices for specific commercial
products.
Another indication of globalization is that instead of
doing everything from building processing equipment to
manufacturing, packaging and shipping themselves, even
huge vertically integrated firms are resorting to out-
sourcing through buying equipment and services from
outside suppliers.
2. Manufacturing technology .
Semiconductors are circuits that are built on silicon
wafers. A wafer is a thin, highly polished silicon crys-
tal disk of 8-inch.
The technique of production involves etching of circuits
on silicon wafers by a combination of photographic tech-
niques ("masking") and chemical baths, followed by ba-
king, cutting into dice, sealing and packaging. Typically
it takes from 10 to 30 days to complete the fabrication
process. For a chip to work, everything - temperature,
timing, density of solutions, vibration levels, dust -
must be precisely controlled. The physics of this process
is not entirely understood so that manufacturing involves
a trial and error process, giving rise to learning by
doing.
Technological progress leads to generations with increa-
sed information storage capacity (taken as product inno-
vation) and to production processes characterized by
smaller design rules (taken as process innovations).
Japan is the leader in process technology and the US in
design technology.
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The improvement of performance is known as the Law of
Moore , one of the founders of Intel. Moore has found that
every two years microchips show a doubling of achieve-
ment. This is due to continuous miniaturisation in produ-
cing chips, so that more transistors may be compressed on
a small area.
The industry has maintained its growth by achieving a 30
percent per-year per-function reduction in cost over its
history. This productivity increase has come through
design innovation, device shrinks, wafer size increases,
yield improvement, and capital equipment utilization
improvements. However, productivity increases resulting
from these improvements have been offset by increased
complexity, chip sizes, and wafer facility costs.
In future, the production process will be subject to two
restrictions.
First, there is the cost problem. A modern chip facility
costs around $1 billion and by the end of the decade the
cost of state-of-the-art plants will have doubled.
Second, there are two technological problems.
* First, over 9 to 15 years the Law of Moore might be
blocked. The yield curve in microprocessors will probably
continue to hold for three generations yet. At this
moment the most advanced equipment can etch details of
0.35 micron (a micro metre is one thousand’s millimetre).
The distance between the transistors on a chip may be
further reduced to some 0.25 micron, but thereafter big
problems will arise. This has to do with the wave-length
of light. Below the 0.10 micron barrier, to be reached by
the year 2008, no solutions are in sight.
* The second technical problem concerns the formation of
heat between the transistors due to the compression on
such a small scale that temperature will be increased.
Cooling with ventilators might postpone this problem, but
it becomes critical when in 2008 the 0.10 micron barrier
will be reached.
Within a few years the generations of microchips will
succeed each other less rapidly. An unpleasant consequen-
ce is that the development of new applications for PC’s
such as recognition of speech will be delayed. This means
that the increasing development efforts will meet less
revenue.
2.1. DRAMs versus EPROMs.
The basic breakdown of semiconductors is into integrated
circuits, which is the largest product line, discrete
devices, and optoelectronic devices. Much of the interna-
tional trade dispute in semiconductors centred on memory
chips, primarily used in computers to store and retrieve
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data, which are technology drivers for other more complex
semiconductors such as in telecommunications. Memories
are divided into volatile and non-volatile devices.
In memory chips a distinction can be made between commo-
dity chips (DRAMs) and specialty memory chips (EPROMs).
This distinction fits within the present trend toward
commoditization and customization.
DRAMs, (Dynamic Random Access Memories) (so-called "in-
dustrial rice") are a volatile device. They temporarily
store large amounts of data or instructions; the memory
disappears when power is turned off. Any randomly selec-
ted location can be accessed and retrieved in the same
amount of time; this contrasts with the time required to
get information from a tape, which depends on the locati-
on of that information. Static RAMs (SRAMs) are faster
but hold less information.
The main application of DRAMs is in computer memory
boards. The storage capacity of DRAMs quadrupples with
each new generation (1K, 4K, 16K, 64K, 256K, 1M, 4M, 16M,
etc.), which comes out every 3 years. Their market suc-
cess depends on low cost of production rather than de-
sign.
EPROMs (Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories) are a
non-volatile memory chip. They store data more permanent-
ly. In ROMs the memory content is loaded during the
manufacturing stage, performing only reading operations,
e.g., a fixed program in a pocket calculator. In EPROMs
the programmes can be erased and changed occasionally.
The main application is in microprocessors. The storage
capacity doubles with each new generation (4K, 8K, 16K
etc.) which comes out every 18 months. Their market
success depends on design and performance more than on
low production cost.
The DRAM market is larger than the EPROM market. Price
competition is more intense in DRAMs. DRAM costs are
mainly determined by current output and age: economies of
scale.
The EPROM market offers more scope for product differen-
tiation. EPROM costs are determined mainly by cumulative
output: learning by doing. Generally, DRAMS have lower
per-bit price than EPROMs.
Due to high switching costs EPROMs of older generations
are still in demand even if new generations are already
on the market. The demand for DRAMs is biased towards the
latest generation.
Both large fixed costs and learning by doing imply that
only a few firms can survive. However, continuous innova-
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tions offset this and allow small start-up firms to enter
the market.
A key transition within DRAMs or EPROMs happens when cost
per bit becomes equivalent for adjacent generations. This
leads to demise of an old generation.
With respect to the appropriability of technology, the
basic technique of production qua design cannot be kept
secret, while the details of production, i.e. gaining
experience, are highly appropriable.
For users, access to-state-of-the-art technology is
critical to successful competition.
In general, prices do the adjustment to shocks, while
output expands continuously.
This contrasts sharply with, e.g., the automobile sector,
where the opposite holds.
It may be concluded that the large market size, the
extended "top-quality status" for the latest generation,
and the limited scope for vertical product differentiati-
on, all contribute to making the DRAM market quite diffe-
rent from the EPROM market.
2.2. Scale economies .
Several sorts of scale economies are prominent in this
production.
1) The cost of building a chip-producing facility; these
costs have increased rapidly over the years as chips have
become more sophisticated and their production more
intricate.
2) The cost of research and development necessary to
introduce a new chip.
These scale economies are static : the costs are incurred
once before production begins and are then averaged over
all chips produced, so that the larger the production,
the smaller the average costs.
Another scale economy is dynamic , being cumulatively
experienced as long as a chip is produced.
When a new chip is introduced, production costs are
typically high, largely because many of the chips are
faulty and must be thrown away. But as more chips are
produced, the firm learns how to do it better, failure
rates fall and costs decline dramatically. This process
has been repeated with the introduction of each new chip
and it is fairly predictable.
Learning by doing takes the form of ever-increasing
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yields, that is ever-increasing percentages of usable
semiconductor chips, as cumulative output rises.
E.g., early in the product cycle as much as 90% of output
is flawed or nonfunctioning; once greater production
experience has been acquired, this failure rate can fall
under 10%.
Another dynamic scale economy extends across generations
of chips: producing one type of chip apparently enhances
the ability of firms to develop and produce future gene-
rations of chips.
Semiconductors are "technology drivers" in that learning
by doing lowers costs in subsequent generations of chips:
"DRAMs are the bellwether" for the industry.
All these scale economies are internal to the individual
chip producer: they depend on what that producer does,
not on what the whole semiconductor industry does, and
they influence the costs of that producer, not the costs
of others.
There are also scale economies external to the individual
chip producer. Semiconductors are intermediate goods,
used in the production of computers, consumer electro-
nics, capital goods and a host of other products.
The production process of chips generates valuable know-
ledge useful to other chip producers and to developers of
products that use chips. This knowledge spills over from
the chip producer to these other firms that can use it.
This spillover occurs due to informal contacts between
individuals in the industry, the mobility of engineers
and all sorts of other forms of observation.
The problem is that externalities are inherently hard to
measure, because by definition they do not leave any
trace in market transactions.
These circumstances generate motives for protection, i.e.
strategic trade policy.
1) The internal economies of scale imply that perfect
competition is unlikely to prevail. This means that
profit shifting could have been a motive: the Europeans
and the Japanese have targeted their industries so that
oligopolistic profits captured from the sale of semicon-
ductors in their countries would go to their own firms
rather than to American firms.
2) The external economies imply that production shifting
may be a motive: due to targeting, knowledge spillovers
from the chip production would flow to their own domestic
firms. If the externalities are international in nature,
e.g., due to direct foreign investments, protection is
unnecessary because the spillovers arise anyhow. Moreo-
ver, if the spillovers are international, the finding of
a spillover does not provide support for policies favo-
ring domestic over foreign firms. Any country that subsi-
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dizes its domestic firms in part provides an internatio-
nal public good. However, as there is a strong national
component in the externalities production shifting may be
a motive.
In an industry characterized by strong learning effects
protection of the home market can have a kind of multip-
lier effect. Privileged access to one market can give
firms the assurance of moving further down their learning
curves and thus can encourage them to price aggressively
in other markets as well. Privileged access to the domes-
tic market was in fact decisive in giving Japanese firms
the ability to compete in the world market.
2.3. Nature of learning economies: empirical evidence.
DRAMs, SRAMs, and EPROMs share a role as "technology
driver", i.e. while the circuit designs themselves differ
significantly between these products, they fundamentally
involve the same manufacturing technology and process
steps.
Multiproduct firms, cet. par., make greater learning
investments in technology drivers and capture greater
learning economies in each derivative product than firms
with a limited product line.
The learning curve may be approximated by specifying
that:
w(E) = φ Eε
This gives yielded chips as a function of experience, E,
where φ equals the wafer fabrication yield, i.e. the
learning curve level parameter. Production typically
starts at low yields; after a period, yields rise quic-
kly, then flatten out in a pattern close to a logistic
curve.
In DRAMs there are several published reports of an empi-
rical 72 percent "learning curve", meaning that current
unit cost drops by 28 percent with every doubling of
output, corresponding to ε = 0,47.
With a constant wafer-processing cost as the only cost
element we have as unit cost:
A learning elasticity ε equal to 0.47 is solved from the
72 percent learning curve:
The slope of the learning curve indicates the percentage
17
cost reduction when cumulative output is doubled.
E.g., in an 85 percent curve the unit cost falls by 15
percent if cumulative output is doubled. Next figure
illustrates this relation between the learning elasticity
and the learning curve slope.
Recently, Irwin and Klenow (1994), estimated the lear-
ning-by-doing spillovers for 8 DRAM generations over
1974-92 on the basis of some 600 quarterly observations
on shipments by merchant firms.
They have tried to disentangle how firm, country and
world cumulative production contribute to the experience,
so that several hypotheses could be tested: learning
purely internal to the firm, external to the firm but
internal to the country and learning external to the firm
and country.
More concretely, they tested how experience, E i , has been
influenced on the basis of next equation:
Ei = Qi + α(QC - Qi ) + γ(QW - QC)
where:
Qi = cumulative output of firm i;
QC = cumulative output of firm i’s base
country;
QW = world cumulative output.
This expression nests next hypotheses:
α = γ = 0 : purely internal learning by doing;
α = 1, γ = 0: learning external to the firm, but
internal to the country;
α = 1, γ = 1: learning external to firm and country.
where:
α = within-country spillover;
γ = cross-country spillover.
Spillover coefficients may represent market (joint ventu-
res or labour mobility) or nonmarket (quid pro quo commu-
nication among engineers) exchanges between firms.
Irwin and Klenow found learning rates varying from 10 to
27 per cent, averaging 20% across 8 generations. This
result is somewhat below the widely reported figure of 28
per cent learning, according to which unit production
costs fall by 28% every time cumulative output doubles.
The average spillover coefficients were: α = .28 and γ =
.32. These low spillover coefficients imply largely
internal learning so that firms learn over three times
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more from each additional unit of own cumulative produc-
tion than from additional units of another firm’s cumula-
tive production.
The small value of α - γ , i.e. 0.04, implies that within-
country spillovers appear no stronger than international
spillovers. Learning spills over just as much between
firms in different countries as between firms within a
given country.
Although it is often emphasized that various "intrinsic"
learning advantages of Japanese firms have contributed
importantly to their new positions as dominant suppliers
in this market (Japanese engineers and production workers
have greater attachment to their employers so that with
the lower turnover and continuity in workforce learning
processes are more effective), according to Irwin and
Klenow there is no empirical basis for believing that
Japanese firms are systematically better at learning from
production experience than other firms. Japanese firms
are indistinguishable from others in learning speeds.
Intergenerational spillovers are weak, being marginally
significant in only two of seven DRAM generations. There-
fore, Japanese industrial targeting does not permanently
affect production and trade in semiconductors.
The absence of important intergenerational spillovers
diminishes the potential advantage of industrial policies
designed to promote the semiconductor industry because
with short (3-5) product cycles, any gains from such
policies are likely to be extremely short-lived.
It may be noted that these results were sensitive to
variations in demand elasticity. The more steeply sloped
the demand curve, the less learning and spillovers are
required to explain sharp declines in price.
With respect to the learning curve at the industry level
Gruber (1994) has found that:
1) For EPROMs cumulative output is the only significant
variable explaining the cost of producing EPROMs. The
learning curve is of 79 per cent type, i.e. doubling
output of EPROMs reduces average cost by 21 per cent.
2) For DRAMs economies of scale i.e. current output and
generation age seem to account for lower costs. In DRAMs
the evolution of prices is better explained by current
output than by the learning curve.
3) For SRAMs generation age is the only significant
explanatory variable.
At the firm level, for EPROMs, the learning curve obtai-
ned is not very different from that estimated at the
industry level.
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Gruber found some evidence for the transferability of
learning within the firm. This implies that an incumbent
firm has an advantage in adopting a new technology compa-
red with a new entrant. Thus leap-frogging in innovation
would be a very costly strategy, although in the DRAM
market it actually occurred.
Since economies associated with learning-by-doing are
important and largely internalized (no spillovers),
increased market concentration is a natural result.
In this respect the Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration
index declines from an initially high level, then to
nearly 0.1 and at the end of the cycle it rises sharply
as producers drop the product line. The U-shaped time
profile reaches the mimimum after about 5 years.
2.4. Intel’s persisting leadership .
One of the often cited explanations for Intels’ persis-
ting leadership is based on the company’s superior tech-
nological competence. Learning by doing, at least if
fully appropriable, seems to play a dominant role there-
by, although learning spillovers diminish the importance
of the leadership advantage and typically generate the
"leap-frogging" result in which firms alternate in inno-
vating first.
However, in the semiconductor industry product performan-
ce and the cost of manufacturing equipment are nonlinear
and this may thwart Intel’s efforts to persist its lea-
dership.
The reason is that relatively large infusions of capital
must be periodically bestowed on equipment and research,
with each infusion exponentially larger than the one
before. Moreover, investments in research and new equip-
ment must generate a healthy rate of profit.
At present, semiconductor companies have no way of deter-
mining precisely the proportion of their financial re-
turns that comes from their technology investments. Not
only must increases in capacity be constantly anticipa-
ted, but also great advances in the manufacturing techno-
logy itself must be foreseen and planned for.
To account for this technology-drag effect the ratio of
cash generated during any given year may be compared with
investments made in new technology, consisting of both
new manufacturing equipment and research and development,
the year before.
What this ratio indicates are incremental profits per
incremental investment, one year removed. It shows how
high a company is keeping its head above water with
respect to profits, thanks to its investment in ever more
costly technology.
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Next chart, borrowed from Hutcheson and Hutcheson (1996),
shows the relation between Intel’s profits and invest-
ments in technology throughout the company’s history.
Plotted points trace loops that each correspond to rough-
ly a six-year cycle.
During each of them, Intel moves from a period of unpro-
fitable operations caused by heavy investment to an
interval of very good cash generation stemming from much
lighter investment. Arrows indicate the year in each
cycle when Intel made the most money and spent lightly on
equipment.
Each loop’s lower portion is lower than the one that
preceded it. This means that Intel’s profits, relative to
the capital expenditure generating them, are declining
with each successive cycle.
From the chart, it is clear that Intel is now entering
another period of heavy capital investment.
3. Characteristics of the industry .
3.1. Captive versus merchant firms.
A basic distinction is between captive and merchant
firms. Captive firms, (IBM), are vertically integrated
and consume the chips they produce, and have little
influence on prices. As purchasers on the market they
desire low prices. Merchant firms (Motorola) produce for
sale. They reap gains from protection and from maintai-
ning high prices.
A distinguishing feature of the US semiconductor industry
is the large number of specialized small producers; in
Europe and Japan, semiconductor manufacturing is domina-
ted by large electronics conglomerates. The US industry
is largely composed of merchants, while Japanese produ-
cers are largely vertically integrated.
Another widely used classification differentiates between
firms manufacturing standard products sold to many diffe-
rent users and customer-specific devices manufactured for
one end-user only, providing the latter firm with a
proprietary component technology. In the standard pro-
ducts or commodity devices Japanese expertise has been of
greatest significance and in these markets the competiti-
ve difficulties of US merchant firms have been most
severe.
The focus of semiconductor manufacturing has been shif-
ting away from the standard components and toward the
custom designing of high-integration application specific
integrated circuits (ASIC) and application specific
standard products (ASSP) devices for particular market
segments. Generic expertise is giving way to specialized
expertise in particular product technologies and markets.
The shift away from standard components has occurred with
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a form of market fragmentation with firms developing
specialized design expertise.
Although the market share of standard components such as
DRAMs remains large, the highest rates of return are
obtained on investments in design intensive products.
The increased emphasis on design expertise has provided
new openings for start-up firms. These are small design
houses that do not have in-house wafer fabrication capa-
bility; they subcontract out the production and assembly
stages of the manufacturing process to external subcon-
tractors. Unlike the smaller start-up firms, the larger
firms have not narrowed their product lines. They produce
a greater variety of products than in the past. However,
the variety of product markets and geographical market
areas has increased rapidly, leaving the large firms with
competency in only a few markets.
The small firms are usually start-up ventures set up to
exploit new technologies. They are mostly on the leading
edge of new product-technology development and are gro-
wing rapidly. Large producers often license technologies
from these start-up firms to complement and extend their
in-house technological capability.
Two elements of this industrial structure stand out as
being of central importance:
1) The key role of start-up firms as agents of technolo-
gical change. The majority of start-up firms were founded
as spin-offs from established producers and they provided
technological opportunities considered too risky by the
parent firms.
2) The tendency toward an "open" technology environment,
that is toward an accelerated flow of knowledge and
information among firms within the US semiconductor
industry.
Barriers-to-entry to semiconductor manufacturing initial-
ly were relatively low because of the open technology-
environment in which technological knowledge and informa-
tion flew rapidly among firms, encouraged by liberal
licensing practices and by the movement of engineering
personnel among firms.
Product licensing gave firms the right to manufacture
semiconductors and interfirm worker mobility supplied the
skills and knowledge necessary to manufacture devices,
thereby alleviating the major barrier-to-entry to the
emerging semiconductor industry.
The open environment in the semiconductor industry and
the accelerated flow of technology among firms suggest
that the consequent leakage of technology from one firm
to another will lead to underinvestment in R&D.
Under-investment in R&D is a serious problem in US high-
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technology industries. The rate of investment in R&D by
US firms is less than that of firms in Japan, Germany and
other international rivals. Throughout the 1970s and
early 1980s, the US industry failed to keep pace with the
investment rates of Japanese firms, (16% versus 28% of
sales), especially because of bank ties of Japanese firms
in the face of slack demand.
Japanese producers invested heavily in highly automated
capacity expansion during recessions based on stable
access to cheap capital afforded by the Japanese financi-
al structure combined with rapid tax write offs, while US
firms delayed or cut back their expansion plans during
rough economic times.
However, on balance the open environment has brought
positive benefits.
* First, this has helped to avoid the "locking-in" of
suboptimal technologies.
* Second, the flow of information among firms has suppor-
ted a process of collective and cumulative learning in
the industry that allowed individual companies to build
on the successes and failures of the industry as a whole.
Thus semiconductor firms have been able to avoid unneces-
sary repetition or research carried out by other firms.
3.2. Strategic subsidization through vertical interacti-
on.
A basic problem on the structure of the semiconductor
industry concerns the long-term relative strengths and
weaknesses of vertically integrated chip makers in compa-
rison with small entrepreneurial technology driven firms.
Vertical integration has become attractive due to need to
transfer proprietary information from designers and
producers of systems to component makers. This lessens
potential competition from others in the upstream or
downstream markets.
Japanese microelectronics firms have managed their inte-
grated businesses strategically in the sense that some
activities in the vertical chain are undertaken princi-
pally as "drivers" for other activities. In Japan some
varieties of integrated circuits are manufactured and
internally transferred at below cost as a means of crea-
ting an advantage for the corporation’s downstream system
products.
When these firms use internal sources of factor supply
and provide sizeable discounts in factor prices relative
to market prices, market share and corporate profits are
increased by such discounts. Therefore, the integrated
firm’s overall corporate profits are increased when it
acts strategically and employs a positive internal inte-
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grated circuit (IC) price discount.
The profits forgone by the IC manufacturing division, a
strategic subsidization, leads the downstream division to
greater market share and profits than its non-integrated
rival. The interactive firm as a whole has greater pro-
fits.
According to Krouse (1995) two conditions require special
attention:
1) When the downstream products are weak substitutes, the
gains to vertical interaction and strategic subsidization
are large.
2) The vertical integrated firm must not organize its
divisions as uncoordinated profit centers because this
may lead to a myopia which does not allow it to recognize
the value in strategic behaviour.
When all Japanese firms act in this strategic way a
prisoner’s dillemma develops, but each is at an advantage
relative to foreign American firms which do not follow
this strategy on the whole.
The conclusion is that purchases of DRAMs at spot prices
finally places American computer manufacturers at a
market disadvantage relative to strategically-minded
vertically interactive Japanese competitors.
The exercise of monopoly power by the vertically integra-
ted Japanese chip suppliers has created an economic
argument for coordinated defensive action by user indus-
tries in the USA by subsidizing high-cost domestic pro-
duction.
It can be illustrated that such a subsidy of high-cost
domestic production is superior to passive acceptance of
uncontested cartelized imports. It saves monopoly profits
that otherwise would have been paid to the Japanese
cartel and as output increases, consumer surplus in the
USA is gained. This analysis may have some relevance for
European semiconductor policy too.
The essentials of this argument can be illustrated in
next figure. The assumed constant cost of Japan are
represented by J-J’. Foreign firms have a higher cost
schedule given by line U-U’. Foreign demand is given by
curve D-D’ and marginal revenue by line MR-MR’. If Japa-
nese producers act as a profit maximizing cartel, they
produce output Q 0, charge price P 0 and collect monopoly
profits P 0AEJ.
If foreign producers effectively contest the market with
costless entry in the industry and are subsidized at cost
level FF’ with output at Q 1, monopoly profits, equal to
Pj ABF that otherwise would have been paid to the cartel
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are saved, and consumers surplus equal to ABC is gained.
The conclusion is that subsidy of high-cost domestic
production is superior to passive acceptance of unconte-
sted cartelized imports.
3.3. Agglomeration economies of Silicon Valley.
In the US semiconductor industry most major merchant
semiconductor firms are clustered in Silicon Valley. The
close proximity of many specialized manufacturers, sup-
pliers and users of semiconductor devices facilitated
communication among firms. As the number of suppliers,
customers and subcontractors in Silicon Valley increased
during the 1960s and 1970s, semiconductor firms were able
to secure substantial economies of agglomeration in their
manufacturing operations.
Most of the semiconductor firms located in Silicon Valley
were founded as "spin-offs" from existing semiconductor
"parent" producers, like Fairchild. Employees left Fair-
child in frustration at the financial policies of the
parent which used much of the profits to feed into other
less successful divisions of the company rather than
reinvesting in new product and process technologies.
The advantages of locating in Silicon Valley took two
basic forms, namely, enhanced access to, and communicati-
on with customers and suppliers, and efficiencies in
hiring and recruitment within the local labour market.
Lacking extensive in-house training programs, start-firms
in Silicon Valley were able rapidly to assemble research
teams by hiring skilled and experienced engineers from
the external local labour market, thereby avoiding the
need to develop requisite skills and experience in-house.
Local access to customers and suppliers is especially
important at the product-development stage of the manu-
facturing process for small start-up firms that lack the
global manufacturing and marketing capabilities of esta-
blished producers. The ability to fill job vacancies by
hiring experienced workers from the local labour market
is one of the major advantages attracting start-up semi-
conductor firms to Silicon valley. Semiconductor engi-
neers in Silicon Valley have a higher level of interfirm
worker mobility than do engineers employed elsewhere in
the USA.
Semiconductor firms in Silicon Valley have also benefit-
ted from the influx of immigrant labour to the region,
that has helped to alleviate upward pressure on wages in
low-skilled production jobs. During the 1960s and 1970s
Asian and Hispanic women replaced white women as the
predominant production workers in Silicon Valley.
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Summarizing, Silicon valley became a major center for the
computer and communications industries and provided
semiconductor firms with local access to key equipmemt
and materials suppliers. The clustering of semiconductor
firms in Silicon Valley has allowed the realisation of
significant economies of agglomeration in labour-market
processes.
Recentely, Audretsch and Feldman (1996) have shown that
in the semiconductor industry 84 of the 172 innovations
recorded, or 48.8%, are concentrated in California and an
additional 10% are recorded in Massachusetts. Thus, these
two states account for over one half of all the innovati-
ons in the semiconductor industry. At the same time,
innovations in the semiconductor industry account for
8.6% of all the innovations in California, while in
Massachusetts this was nearly 4.7%.
With respect to the reason why innovations tend to clus-
ter spatially more in some industries than in other
industries, both authors argue that innovative activity
will be more geographically concentrated in industries
where production is also geographically concentrated. The
key determinant of the extent to which the location of
production is geographically concentrated is the relative
importance of new economic knowledge in the industry.
Industries in which knowledge spillovers are more preva-
lent, that is where industry R&D, university research and
skilled labour are the most important, have a greater
propensity for innovative activity to cluster than indus-
tries where knowledge externalities are less important.
3.4. Bifurcated system of production in the USA .
Although US semiconductor firms are "technology driven"
focusing their best resources and expertise on the deve-
lopment of new technologies, they were less successful in
addressing problems within the domain of production which
became increasingly important since the mid-1960s.
The basic reason was that US semiconductor firms adopted
a classic bifurcated manufacturing form, with one segment
oriented toward innovation and new product development,
the other focused on reducing the production costs of
existing products.
The drive to lower production costs centered on two key
strategies:
1) The exploitation of product-specific economies of
scale through high-volume production of standard pro-
ducts. Firms seek to establish a stable and routine
production procedure that minimizes product and process
variation in order to preserve a high-yield production
process.
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2) In an attempt to reduce labour costs by relocating
assembly and other routinized activities to selected low-
wage sites, firms adopted a classic tripartite spatial
and international division of labour comprising:
a) centers of innovation and product development located
within major high-technology complexes, like Silicon
Valley;
b) routinized high-volume fabrication facilities located
at dispersed low-wage sites outside the major metropoli-
tan areas in the USA, and
c) labour-intensive assembly operations at low-wage
locations offshore, especially in Southeast Asia.
The locational dispersal of routinized assembly activi-
ties was in part a response to rising land and labour
costs and to associated labour shortages in Silicon
Valley. Semiconductor firms were drawn to supplies of
nonunion labour outside of the established centers of the
Manufacturing Belt. New immigrants and ethnic minorities
were the primary source of production workers.
This emergent spatial and international division of
labour adopted by the US semiconductor industry was
borrowed from the best practice in other sectors of mass
production, such as automobiles, consumer appliances and
textiles.
However, the commitment to standardized production and
the organizational separation of production and innovati-
on generated persistent problems of low production yields
and fluctuating levels of capacity utilization. The rapid
pace of technological change intensified these problems.
The knowledge and technology to compete in ASIC and ASSP
markets is now rapidly diffusing throughout the world. To
remain competitive in the long run US firms must attain
international standards of production performance and
accelerate their rate of product and process technology
development. The challenge is to establish production
forms that permit high-quality production under continu-
ous innovation.
At present the general tendency among US firms is to
deemphasize commodity products on which competition from
Japan and South Korea is strongest, in favor of high-
integration, design-intensive products produced with
advanced design tools and flexible manufacturing techno-
logies.
This shift away from commodity products has provided some
immediate relief from intense price competition and has
helped to bolster the profitability of US merchant firms.
However, design-intensive products do not provide a place
to hide from global competition.
27
Another recent trend in the industry is that expensive
wafer fabrication ("front-end") is increasingly performed
by foundries for another microchip supplier.
"Back-end" assembly and test operations are also outsour-
ced. A new type of advanced chip supplier is the design-
focused fabless house which does not produce wafers.
3.5. Market strategies .
In the semiconductor industry firms qua time profile of
market shares follow one of three distinct strategies in
respect of their timing of entry into each new generation
of products:
(1) to enter early and the market share begins from unity
and falls monotonically;
(2) to follow the leader after some lapse of time and the
share profile first falls and then rises;
(3) to enter late with a monotonically rising share
profile.
Due to successive entry by other firms the market share
of the leader declines steadily for a given product and
eventually becomes zero because he switches to a higher
quality. This strategy has been called cream-skimming .
Intel has used a "cream-skimming" rather than a forward
pricing strategy, whereby it introduces a product early
but at a high price and withdraws the product after other
firms begin marketing the product at lower prices.
Texas Instruments is a highly efficient producer and is
known for its marketing strategy of undercutting competi-
tors’ prices to capture a greater market share.
Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) is known as second source
producer or imitator and enters late into a given genera-
tion and tries to stay until the end.
3.6. Cost-price relation .
Technological progress in the production of memory chips
leads to generations with increased information storage
capacity (taken as product innovation) and to production
processes characterized by smaller design rules (taken as
process innovations).
A remarkable characteristic of chips in general is the
strong and regular price reduction for chips of a given
generation ascribed to learning by doing.
At the beginning of the product cycle of a given genera-
tion the price is very high, but it quickly falls to the
level where it becomes competitive with the previous
generation in terms of per bit price.
E.g., for a 16K EPROM to compete effectively with a 8K
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EPROM it is sufficient for the price not to be higher
than twice that of the 8K device.
Learning in semiconductors takes the form of increasing
yields, meaning rising output, as experience accumulates.
Average costs fall at about the rate that output rises.
However, prices fall at the rate that output increases
times the inverse demand elasticity (which is approxima-
tely -1.5).
With average costs falling faster than prices, the price
path in a competitive market must involve prices below
average cost in the early part of the product life, with
prices above average cost in the latter part.
With respect to the evolution of the per-bit cost, initi-
ally higher capacity devices may have a higher per-bit
cost because of their lower initial yield, but once the
firm has learned, higher capacity devices have a lower
per-bit cost. Thereafter, the only way to reduce the per-
bit cost is to increase memory capacity.
The per-bit cost of a chip, after the firm has learned,
depends basically on the design rule. The design rule is
a rough measure of the state of the art in Metal Oxide on
Silicon (MOS) process technology. It indicates the typi-
cal size of the lithographic patterns of the chip.
Firms may not immediately adopt the newest process avai-
lable because of the substantial cost of re-equiping
production facilities.
Competition among firms pushes them to adopt processes
with smaller and smaller design rules.
Firms without sufficient experience with an old process
should not immediately adopt the smallest design rule
available because a rather low initial yield would be
achieved and learning would take a very long time.
Flamm (1990) mentions that there is widespread speculati-
on that memory pricing in the future would follow the
"bai-rule" rather than the "pi-rule".
The pi-rule refers to the fact that historically DRAM
prices for each generation of chip had tended to decline
asymptotically toward the $3 level (pi = 3.14) as mass
production of that generation peaked.
A new generation of chip was introduced every 3 years
which quadruppled the number of bits on a chip, resulting
in 1/4 of the initial cost.
This amounted to a 75% cost reduction every 3 years, or
annually to a decline of 36%, estimated on the basis of
actual historical data.
The bai-rule (meaning doubling) suggests that every new
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generation of chips (quadruppling the number of bits)
will double in price as mass production peaks.
This means a 50% cost reduction in bits every 3 years,
for an annual decline of about 20%, or about 50% less
than under the pi-rule.
This change in pricing rules would have implications for
the downstream computerindustry. As computer demand is
quite sensitive to computer price, a change from the pi-
rule to the bai-rule for chips will result in diminished
growth of computer demand.
It has been estimated by Flamm that the reduced long-run
rate of decline in memory cost could reduce the demand
growth for computers due solely to computing power from
5.5% a year under the pi-rule to 3% a year under the bai-
rule, with obvious deleterious effects for computer
hardware and software producers.
Note that the elasticity of computer demand with respect
to semiconductor prices is approximately equal to the
product of the elasticity of computer demand with respect
to computer price (-1,5), times the cost share of semi-
conductors in computer cost (0,1).
Therefore: -0,15 times -36% results in 5.5% for the pi-
rule and -0,15 times -20% results in 3% for the bai-rule.
However, diminished industry growth is not the worst
possible scenario for downstream users. They may be left
disadvantaged relative to their vertically integrated
competitors by the possibility of differential access to
chips; they may have difficulties in obtaining the very
latest high-performance chips from their Japanese sup-
pliers.
3.7. Technical versus economic barriers.
It has been difficult to predict when - or if - the
stream of creative improvements will dry up.
Nevertheless, the economic consequences of approaching
technical barriers will be felt before the barriers
themselves are reached. E.g., the costs or achieving
higher levels of chip performance rise very rapidly as
the limits of a manufacturing technology are approached
and then surpassed. Next figure illustrates this point.
Technology barriers, T 1 and T2, are where minute increases
in chip performance can be achieved only at a huge cost.
Economic barriers are encountered well before the techno-
logical ones. These occur where increasing costs may
drive prices beyond the maximum price buyers are willing
to pay, (at E 1 and E2), causing the market to stagnate
before the actual barriers are encountered.
Eventually, as a new manufacturing technology takes hold,
the costs of fabricating chips begin to decline. At this
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point, the industry has jumped from a cost-performance
curve associated with the old technology to a new curve
for the new process.
In effect, the breakthrough from one manufacturing tech-
nology to another forces the cost curve to bend downward,
pushing technical limits farther out.
When this happens, higher levels of performance are
obtainable, shifting the barriers to E 2 and T2, without an
increase in cost prompting buyers to replace older equip-
ment.
This is important in the electronics industry, because
products seldom wear out before becoming obsolete.
The barriers now being approaced are so high that getting
beyond them will probably cause more far-reaching changes
than did previous cycles of this kind.
The fact that factories cost so much as $1 billion is one
piece of evidence that formidable technical barriers are
close. However, the fear that the barriers might be
unsurmountable, bringing the industry to a halt, seems to
be unfounded. Rather the prices of semiconductors may
increase and the rate of change in the industry may slow.
3.8. Recessions.
The semiconductor industry seems to go through a recessi-
on roughly every four years: in 1977, 1981, 1985, 1990-91
and 1995-1996.
With each cyclical downturn, semiconductor companies have
been forced to make painful adjustments.
US companies dealt with downturns by cutting variable
costs through laying off workers and cutting back on new
capital investments.
In Japan the established practice of lifetime employment
precluded lay-offs of large segments of the work force.
Thanks to deep financial pockets Japanese corporations
were able to continue to invest heavily in new plant
facilities.
Thus differences in labour and capital markets led to
different corporate responses to recession in the US and
Japan.
Moreover, vertically integrated, diversified Japanese
companies utilized the built-in advantages of cross-
subsidization out of profits earned by the sale of down-
stream consumer electronics products, such as video
cassette recorders, which had a natural stabilizing
effect during demand downturns.
A lesson learned by both the Americans and the Japanese
during recessions was that the products embodying older
technology tend to be the most vulnerable. Wherever
possible, they tried to roll back manufacturing capacity
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in older products and to push aggressively ahead in
products incorporating newer technology.
To make this move, attention turned to the advantages of
joining forces with well-chosen corporate partners.
American and Japanese firms began to see strategic alli-
ances as a practical, countercyclical option. Below in
par. 8 this phenomenon will be discussed more deeply.
4. Causes of decline in US competitiveness .
Of great importance in achieving technology and market
leadership by Japan were differences in the structure of
manufacturing systems in the USA and Japan.
Much of the loss of market share experienced by US high-
technology firms during the 1980s derived not from a
shortage of innovative capability, but from notoriously
poor production yields, low production quality and fluc-
tuating production capacity. These production problems
arose in part from a fundamental tension between the
drive to reduce costs on existing products and pressures
to introduce new products and production processes.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as explained above, US
semiconductor firms maintained a bifurcated manufacturing
system: one segment was oriented toward technological
development and problems of innovation, whereas the other
segment was focused on production and problems of produc-
tion cost.
At the root of the problem lay a narrow conception of
technological change. There was a tendency to view rapid
technological change as almost exclusively a problem of
innovation, i.e., to develop the next generation, while
the actual production was carried out with little regard
to the rapid technological change. Production and assem-
bly functions were optimized for the low-cost manufacture
of existing products rather than for manufacturing under
conditions of rapid technological change.
As the design of new devices proceeded with insufficient
input from production engineers concerning the possibili-
ty of achieving high yields on different product techno-
logies, the organizational separation of technology
development and production generated serious problems of
"manufacturability".
Moreover, in response to rising land and labour costs and
to associated labour shortages in Silicon Valley, a
locational dispersal of routinized assembly activities
took place. Routinized high-volume fabrication facilities
were located at dispersed low-wage sites outside the
major metropolitan areas in the USA, and labour-intensive
assembly operations at low-wage locations offshore. While
R&D and innovation remained clustered in core locations,
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production and assembly tasks were shifted to dispersed
low-cost locations in the US and offshore. However, under
conditions of rapid technological change, the geographi-
cal separation of production and innovation generated
serious difficulties in transferring new technologies
from the laboratory to the factory floor.
Therefore, the organizational and geographical separation
of technology development and production undermined the
ability of US firms to codevelop both new products and
new production capability.
Hence, during the 1960s and 1970s US semiconductor firms
experienced high levels of instability in production, the
cost of which were also passed on to equipment and mate-
rial suppliers, thereby undermining the ability of sup-
pliers to finance the development of next-generation
manufacturing technologies.
As long as US firms maintained a technological advantage
over their international rivals, these production diffi-
culties primarily affected profit margins rather than
market share.
The Japanese challenge was aimed at the weakest link in
the US semiconductor industry, namely, production. Ja-
pan’s rapid penetration of advanced integrated-circuit
product markets was the result of a complex of factors,
including low capital costs, a protected domestic market,
and a willingness at times to sell below production cost
in order to capture market share.
Underlying much of the success of Japanese firms was a
close integration of technology development and producti-
on activities.
Japanese firms were committed to production as opposed to
the tendency in the USA to accord higher priority to
product technology.
Japanese firms tended to break with the bifurcated manu-
facturing forms typical in the USA. The Japanese commit-
ment to device performance and technological sophistica-
tion was balanced by a concern for the manufacturability
of products and the development of product and process
technologies that allowed for high yields in production.
This involved the use of conservative circuit designs,
scaling up from existing technology wherever possible to
minimize device failure. Most US producers employed more
complex circuit designs encountering serious yield pro-
blems.
Japanese firms captured important first-mover advantages
in 64K, 256K and 1M DRAM devices. They were further down
the learning curve and had fine-tuned the fabrication
line to eliminate many sources of device-failure. The
high yields by Japanese firms reflected quality control
and the investment in production automation.
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Throughout the 1980s, Japanese producers made substantial
investments in automated production and assembly equip-
ment, chemical purification, clean-room technology,
process control and the development of work practices to
eliminate device failure.
Close relations between semiconductor firms and equipment
suppliers were another characteristic of semiconductor
manufacturing in Japan that contributed to the Japanese
success in DRAMs.
Relations between US semiconductor firms and equipment
suppliers were often strained. Rather than developing
long-term partnership agreements with equipment supp-
liers, US semiconductor firms switched among many compe-
ting firms in a search for the most advanced technology.
In addition, they transferred much of the cost of fluctu-
ating demand to their equipment suppliers in the form of
canceled or reduced orders for capital equipment. Quick
to double orders in boom times, device makers moved even
faster to cancel during the bust.
By contrast, Japanese producers formed strong partners-
hips with equipment suppliers, thereby facilitating
investments in new equipment technologies and supporting
the emergence of a strong equipment industry.
As the costs of new equipment technology increased, it
became increasingly difficult for small US equipment
manufacturers to compete, resulting in increasing Japane-
se dominance in equipment manufacturing.
Between 1983 and 1989, the US share of the worldwide
market for wafer fabrication equipment declined from 62%
to 41%, while Japanese firms increased their market share
from 28% to 48%. In 1979, 9 of the top 10 semiconductor
equipment manufacturers in the world were US firms; in
1989, only 4 US firms ranked in the top 10.
Two sets of additional events helped to secure greater
market share for Japanese firms.
First, the large integrated organizational structure of
Japanese semiconductor firms placed them in a stronger
position for dealing with the recession of the mid 1980s.
During this period of declining sales and rapid price
reductions, both US and Japanese firms were selling below
manufacturing cost.
It is estimated that during this period Japanese semicon-
ductor firms suffered operating losses of approximately
$4 billion. They were willing to do so in order to achie-
ve the long-term goal of increasing market share within
the USA. From 1983 onward, investments in new equipment
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and facilities by Japanese firms exceeded those of US
merchant producers, i.e. as a percentage of semiconductor
sales twice those of US merchant firms.
Second, Japanese firms sold within a relatively protected
domestic market and at higher prices than in the USA.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, US firms were prevented
from establishing wholly owned subsidiaries in Japan and
this has limited the ability of the latter to gain sub-
stantial market share. While dominating their domestic
market, Japanese firms have expanded their capability to
manufacture advanced semiconductors in the USA. During
the mid-1980s, all of the major Japanese semiconductor
firms opened fabrication facilities in the USA, primarily
for the production of DRAM devices.
In 1991 US firms supply approximately 14% of the Japanese
market, while Japanese firms hold 22% of the US market.
The low levels of sales of US firms in Japan are especi-
ally significant as the Japanese market for DRAMs and
other advanced integrated-circuit devices has experienced
rapid growth. By 1991 Japanese firms are the largest
consumers of integrated circuits in the world; that is
38% of the worldwide market.
Due to a slump in semiconductor sales in 1974-75, US
firms reduced dramatically their capital investment in
new production facilities. When demand for semiconductors
began to increase in 1977-78, shortages of production
capacity rapidly emerged. Facing lengthy delivery delays,
many US customers turned to Japanese firms as a source of
supply.
The principal lesson for US merchant semiconductor produ-
cers to be learnt from the events of the late 1970s was
the need to avoid a shortage of fabrication capacity. By
investing in new production capacity US firms expected to
recapture in 64K and 256K DRAMs the market share they had
lost in 16k devices.
In response to competition from Japan, from the mid-1980s
onward, the majority of US semiconductor firms initiated
a major restructuring of their manufacturing operations
in order to increase yields and improve production quali-
ty.
Much of the attention of US semiconductor firms is now
focused not in the research laboratory but on the factory
floor; the ability to stabilize new technologies in
production and then to ramp up rapidly to high-yield
production is central to the process of continuous inno-
vation. Increased emphasis is placed on sources of inno-
vation within the manufacturing system, that is, on the
development of new technologies, work practices, and
product ideas.
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It is realised in the US semiconductor industry that the
dynamics of innovation is not simply a matter of techno-
logy development. Innovation also involves the simultane-
ous development of new work practices, new markets and
new uses for these technologies.
The present attempts of US semiconductor firms to reinte-
grate and recentralize manufacturing systems around a
core of ongoing innovation have an important implication
for the geography of production: locational decisions are
now driven not by factor input costs but by issues of
communication and learning.
At the same time, this restructuring has involved closer
and more collaborative relations between semiconductor
firms and their customers, subcontractors, and equipment
suppliers.
These actions have substantially improved manufacturing
performance in the USA. While the yields of Japanese
semiconductor firms remain somewhat higher than those of
their US competitors, the gap has substantially narrowed.
Product defects in the US declined from an average of
170-190 parts-per-million in 1986 to an average of 50-60
parts-per-million in 1990. Probe yields of US firms
increased from 60% in 1986 to 84% in 1991. During the
same period, yields achieved by Japanese firms increased
from 75% to 93%, thus narrowing the difference in yields
from 15% in 1986 to 9% in 1991.
This reduction in the yield differential enhanced the
ability of US firms to compete with Japanese producers
during the late 1980s.
5. Global competition .
The DRAM market has become the battlefield for the pro-
duct development of commodity chips. This market has seen
a dramatic change is its structure starting at the end of
the 1970s.
The US firms have dominated the market since its incepti-
on at the beginning of 1970, in particular through INTEL,
the inventor of the DRAM. Intel had the leadership in
product innovation for the first three generations.
In the early 1970s the US enjoyed a 70% share in the
world market, which was less than $5 billion.
Once large Japanese companies had acquired the necessary
process technology and production experience, they ente-
red into DRAM production and invested heavily in capaci-
ty. In the late 1970s the US was losing its lead and were
overtaken by Japanese firms in 1986.
Because of the intensity of price competition most of the
US firms (including INTEL) abandoned the DRAM production.
Since then the DRAM market has been dominated by Japanese
companies.
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Summarizing, two key intersecting dimensions of economic
globalisation triggered far-reaching changes in the US
semiconductor industry:
1) The erosion of US technological and market leadership
and the emergence of advanced semiconductor-manufacturing
capability in Japan, South Korea and several Western
European countries.
2) A rapid expansion of non-US markets for semiconductor
products.
A critical factor in the manufacture of leading-edge
circuits is the timely availability of the best process
equipment . The SME (Semiconductor Manufacturing Equip-
ment) industry emerged in the 1970s and was also at first
US dominated.
Parallel to the declining competitiveness in chips have
been concerns about the health of the US semiconductor
manufacturing equipment industry, which saw its world
market share decline from 75% in 1980 to 50% in 1992,
while the Japanese share rose from 18% in 1980 to 43% in
1992. Today the equipment business is about $10 billion
annually.
US chip makers feared to become dependent on Japanese
suppliers of chip-making equipment. Such concerns were
heightened by Japanese acquisitions of US chip-making
firms and by withholding state-of-the-art technology by
Japanese firms. In reality, the decline of the US share
in this market was due to the decline of the US as a
location of chip production and the exit of US firms from
high-volume DRAM production.
Because Japanese chip producers were part of larger
systems houses they were getting access to leading-edge
products before their foreign competitors. This has put
US and other foreign systems houses at a competitive
disadvantage.
In 1980, Japan accounted for about 30% of the memory
market. By 1989 they accounted for more than 80%. Thus,
during this period, the US moved from being the dominant
producer in both memory and more sophisticated chips to
being dominant only in the latter.
The rapid emergence of the Japanse industry as a world-
class competitor was a planned result of a concerted
policy effort of the Japanese government employing a
variety of policy tools. Without the active government
policy in the 1970s the Japanese industry could not have
climbed to international prominence.
The Japanese government principally through MITI pursued
two sets of policies:
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* Controlled access, i.e. controlling the links between
the Japanese market and international markets by limiting
foreign competition in the domestic market through a
closure of domestic markets to imports, reinforcing "buy
Japan" policies, acquiring foreign technology and know-
how in the form of patents, licenses and expertise, and
initiating barriers to foreign direct investment.
* Manipulating the domestic firms to stimulate expansion.
The government reduced the cost of the riskiest and least
predictable phase of the R&D process through support of a
joint research venture, the Very Large Scale Integration
(VSLI) project which encouraged the diffusion of the
generic technologies with wide application and common
product techniques.
Therefore, a classic strategy of infant-industry protec-
tion and promotion in Japan created a competitive Japane-
se industry. The Japanese government provided R&D subsi-
des and home-market protection encouraging predatory low
export pricing. Barriers to both imports and foreign
direct investment by American companies were a key ingre-
dient of Japan’s policy. The existence of dynamic econo-
mies of scale has made import protection a policy of
export promotion.
It was expected that in the long run, with the exit of
foreign competitors and taking the lion’s share of the
market, prices could be increased so that rents could be
collected to offset the initial costs of predation by
collusion whereby Japanese companies are cooperating to
cut back supply on foreign markets.
With the growth of the protected Japanese market and the
"success" of the Japanese challenge began a 15-year
struggle by the USA to open the Japanese market and to
counteract predatory Japanese pricing. In this respect
Baldwin and Krugman contend that this "success" was
actually a net loss to the Japanese economy. It raised
Japanese prices, hurting consumers, without generating
compensating producer gains. The policy was thus not a
successful beggar-my-neighbor one, or more accurately it
beggared Japan’s neighbor only at the cost of beggaring
Japan as well.
Captive producers in the USA were cautious about initia-
ting any trade dispute with Japan. Not only did IBM have
substantial investments in Japan, but as a net purchaser
it had little interest in policies that might result in
higher prices.
Merchant firms like Motorola wanted to diminish Japanese
competition and to raise the price of their output.
For years, the Europeans worried about American dominati-
on of the computer industry.
Throughout the 1970s European systems companies grew
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increasingly dependent on chips produced by US companies.
However, this posed no threat to the European companies
because the intense competition among US merchant semi-
conductor manufacturers meant a continuous stream of new
leading-edge products with prices dropping rapidly.
Today Europe must also reckon with Japan (and Asia more
generally). Europe has fallen into third place in the
global electronics competition, suffering dependency on
not just one but two competitive regions.
In the last few years since 1992 the US has recovered
overall market share and took back the lead in terms of
where chips are produced with 43% share versus 41% for
Japan.
6. The Semiconductor Trade Agreements.
6.1. Events leading up to the Trade Agreement (SCTA) of
1986 .
In 1977 several merchant firms formed together the
Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) to promote
common interests. The SIA’s primary function is to provi-
de a forum for industry leaders to reach a consensus on
issues of joint concern and to oversee any political
action based on whatever consensus emerged, and coordina-
tes the industry’s political strategy.
Initially the SIA lacked the stature to accomplish policy
actions. In 1982 the SIA broadened its membership to
include vertically-integrated captive producers, and this
exerted a moderating influence on trade policy.
Although the semiconductor consumers were organized in
the American Electronics Association (AEA), they felt
that their interests were not being met by the AEA.
Therefore, early 1989 three major computer systems firms
formed the Computer Systems Policy Project (CSPP) to
function as a counterpart to the SIA and to facilitate
and coordinate the industry’s positions on public policy
and to develop policy recommendations relating to the
competitive position of the computer manufacturers.
As a result of this coalition of semiconductor consumers,
US trade negotiators no longer faced the single voice of
the SIA on what should determine US semiconductor trade
policy.
The demands by US semiconductor producers for trade
relief were strongly associated with the industry reces-
sions.
During the 1974-75 recession, there was no significant
pressure to limit imports or take other trade-related
actions in the US. But in the early 1980s competition
entered a new phase as Japanese companies attacked the
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international market.
During the 1981 recession steeply falling prices for
semiconductors along with the early Japanese capture of
70% of the market for 64K DRAMs, triggered a political
response by US industry.
However, the regular trips by representatives of the
semiconductor industry to Washington got a cool reception
there.
This may be traced to several things:
* The Reagan administration had a rhetorical commitment
to free trade and confronting US producers with a rude
shock of foreign competition and a healthy dose of compe-
tition was no cause for alarm.
* The US semiconductor industry was hardly on its de-
athbed: the merchant industry was still profitable.
In 1985 the market situation changed dramatically as the
electronics industry throughout the world entered a deep
recession that lasted until the middle of 1987. In an
effort to maintain sales volume, both US and Japanese
producers cut prices which for 64 DRAMs fell from $4.00
in 1984 to $1.00 in 1985.
The industry recession in 1985 was extremely severe and
concentrated on the memory chip market. It pushed virtu-
ally every US producer out of the DRAM market. Only TI
and Micron remained in the merchant DRAM market, although
IBM and AT&T continued captive production. In the face of
huge operating losses many US merchant semiconductor
firms withdrew from the DRAM market in 1985.
The root cause of the contraction of the DRAM market in
1985 was a rapid price decline in the face of slumping
demand with unprecedented losses for US merchant semicon-
ductor firms.
Imports were not a direct cause of the industry recessi-
on: Japanese penetration actually fell in the two years
after 1984.
US firms faced several obstacles beyond their control and
these factors contributed to an exodus of US firms from
the DRAM market:
1) high cost of capital compared with Japan;
2) substantial appreciation of the US dollar in the early
1980s;
3) the US industry was unprepared for a change in process
technology away from the standard N-channel metal oxide
semiconductor to complementary metal oxide semiconductor
favored by Japan;
4) with respect to quality, Japanese chips showed fewer
defects. Although US producers heatedly denied this, the
perception of a quality gap shifted demand to Japanese
firms.
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In 1985 the famous cross-over occurred: the global share
of the Japanese companies in the semiconductor market
jumped ahead of that of the US companies. The trending
down of the American market share and the going up of
Japan’s may be called the X-curve. By the end of the
decade, Japanese firms held in excess of 70% of the world
market for DRAM integrated circuits.
In 1985 the descent of the semiconductor industry to
Washington received a much warmer welcome than in 1982.
In 1982, the industry was split on filing an antidumping
petition and faced resistance by the Administration on
any Section 301 action; in 1985, its course of action has
been largely welcomed by the government, having to do
with the appreciation of the US dollar and the large
trade deficit.
US firms complained about two issues: dumping by Japanese
firms and a lack of access to the Japanese market.
US semiconductor firms claimed that Japanese firms should
be penalized for their unfair practices of dumping 64K
DRAMs at less than fair value, with fair value being
defined as the price required to gain a normal rate of
return from the production and sale of DRAM devices. The
US blamed the lack of real market access squarely on the
Japanese government, so that a Section 301 action of the
Trade Act of 1974 against Japan was prepared in order to
open the Japanese market in such a way that "the cash
registers ring".
The administration formulated a two-pronged policy:
* An exchange rate policy aimed at reducing the foreign
exchange value of the dollar;
* Market-opening initiatives aimed at diverting protecti-
onist pressures by focusing on measures to open up the
Japanese market rather than closing the US market.
Between June and December 1985 a series of antidumping
and unfair trade practice suits have been filed in the
US, charging Japanese firms with dumping 64K DRAM chips
in mid-1986.
The SIA based its demands on the now familiar "market
share shuffle", in which Washington cites low share in
Japan as proof of a rigged economy. The argument worked
out this way: the US industry had 83% of sales in its
home market, 55% in the European market, 47% in the rest
of the world, but only 11% in Japan. This would be a
strong suggestion that market barriers exist in Japan,
although no specific impediment to imports could be
identified.
There was a lot wrong with this argument. The 11% figure
was a deliberate distortion. If captive production (that
is chips produced by semiconductor firms for own use) was
excluded from the count, American firms already had about
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a 20% share of the Japanese market in 1985. This was
about the same as the Japanese share of the American
market at the time. When captive production was not
excluded from the US calculation, Japanes firms had a
12.3% share of the American market in 1984, 10.6% share
in 1985 and only a 9.8% share in 1986.
Another problem with the SIA’s position was its assertion
that the Japanese government "unfairly" subsidized its
semiconductor firms, while in actuality US government
assistance for private semiconductor research and deve-
lopment was about 10 times Japan’s in 1986. There were
also severe quality and delivery problems with many of
the American chip products. The failure rate of American
chips was six times the rate of Japanese semiconductors.
The conflict between the US and Japanese industries came
to a head in June 1985, when the SIA submitted a Section
301 petition against unfair Japanese trading practices.
Shortly thereafter, a US firm, Micron Technology, charged
the Japanese with dumping 64K DRAMs. In August 1985, the
Justice Department opened an antitrust investigation into
possible predatory pricing by Hitachi. In September 1985,
three more American firms filed dumping complaints a-
gainst Japanese producers of EPROMs. In December 1985,
the Commerce Department in an extraordinary move initia-
ted a dumping case in 256K DRAMS.
The ITC found substantial evidence of sales of DRAMS and
EPROMs at below Fair Market Value and tariffs were recom-
mended on Japanese imports equal to the margin of dumping
ranging from 10.9% to 35.3%. In June 1986 the ITC found
that Japanese firms were selling DRAMs at a weighted
average of 20.75% less than fair value.
As a result, tariffs equal to the calculated difference
between the market price and costs could be imposed on
Japanese imports.
However, in fact this should be an empty victory, due to
the speed at which this industry evolves. The ruling
should come into effect after the industry would have
moved on to the next generation (256K). Therefore, there
would be few imports on which to impose the dumping
margins.
Although the Electronic Industry Association of Japan
(EIAJ) and the SIA kept the international trade lawyers
busy by filing counterbriefs to each other’s briefs, in
the end the pressures to move forward with a significant
market-opening initiative against Japan triumphed.
In order to short-cut subsequent legal actions Japan
moved to reach a bilateral settlement. The actual imposi-
tion of tariff penalties was avoided with the signing of
the SemiConductor Trade Agreement (SCTA) on September 2,
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1986. As the dumping complaints have been settled by the
SCTA, later dumping cases involving 256K DRAM chips and
EPROMs have been suspended.
Since 1985 the anticipated collapse of the US industry
did not occur. In fact, the manufacturing performance of
US firms has improved dramatically in the 1990s. Market
share has stabilized and cycle-time for the development
of new products and processes has been substantially
reduced.
6.2. The contents of the SCTA.
The 1986 SCTA was a response to the US perception of
unfair competition from Japan. It contained eight provi-
sions.
1) The Japanese government would monitor costs and prices
of chip exports from Japan to the US and other markets.
2) Japanese firms would submit cost and price data to
MITI.
3) If dumping appeared to be occurring, the two govern-
ments would have two weeks to pursue consultations before
proceeding with the case.
4) The Japanese government would try to prevent dumping
by Japanese firms.
These four provisions effectively created a firm-specific
price floor for semiconductors.
The other four provisions were aimed at increasing for-
eign firms’ access to the Japanese market.
5) The Japanese government would encourage Japanese
producers and consumers to purchase more foreign chips. A
secret side-letter to the Agreement called for increasing
the foreign share to 20 percent.
6) The Japanese government would establish an organizati-
on in Japan to help foreign producers increase sales in
Japan.
7) The Japanese government would promote long-term rela-
tionships between Japanese and foreign firms.
8) The Japanese government would ensure full and equit-
able access for foreign firms to patents generated by
government-sponsored R&D.
Summarizing, the SCTA contained two main components:
1) It establishes an explict price floor for semiconduc-
tors intended to promote competition by halting predatory
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pricing: this amounted to a voluntary export restraint (a
VER) by Japan. Japan would provide the US with cost
information necessary to calculate price floors for DRAMs
and agreed not to sell products at prices below these
values.
2) It contains provisions aimed at doubling the US market
share in Japan by 1991 to counter the alleged market
closure: this amounted to a voluntary import expansion by
Japan (a VIE). Japan agreed to facilitate increased sales
by US firms in Japan toward a 20% US share of the Japane-
se market by 1992.
Although its contents were widely known at the time, the
letter remained officially secret. This secrecy allowed
both sides to deny that they had carved up markets in a
managed trade agreement, but the effect was asymmetric:
Japan denied there was any explicit commitment about
guaranteeing a market share, while the US held Japan
accountable for such a commitment though it could not
produce the text in public to support its position.
US negotiators interpreted the accord as a guarantee that
Japan would increase its consumption of US semiconductors
to the 20% level, while Japanese negotiators interpreted
the figure as a goal that might or might not be met,
depending on the demand for US semiconductors in Japan.
Therefore, there was a fundamental misunderstanding about
what was involved. Japan regarded the 20 percent figure
as a target at which to aim, while the US considered it a
firm commitment - and a minimum one - which the Japanese
had promised to fulfill.
6.3. Subsequent events.
There were almost immediately problems. While the arti-
fical controls drove up chip prices sharply in the US,
some two to eight times in the initial months after the
agreement before abating somewhat, the market distortions
created an arbitrageur’s dream. Some of the arbitrageurs
(more commonly known as smugglers) took advantage of the
bargain basement prices in Japan, where the average chip
cost at least $2 less than elsewhere, and flew hither and
yon with satchels and suitcases stuffed with semiconduc-
tors. One bag of smuggled chips might save a savvy buyer
from the US or Europe tens of thousands of dollars.
To implement the Agreement MITI did the only thing it
could, (recall that no specific impediment to imports
could be identifed so that Tokyo had no effective means
of rectifying the situation) and established a production
cartel issuing quarterly forecasts of chip demand and
production. Amazingly, that was greeted by screams from
the SIA that MITI was trying to create "artificial shor-
tages".
However, initially, prices remained low and the US warned
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Japan that it was not adhering to the Agreement.
In 1987 US firms accused Japan of violating the agreement
by selling DRAMs at below fair value in third markets
(primarily Taiwan and other Southeast Asian countries).
The USA responded by imposing punitive duties on $300
million of Japanese exports to the USA.
In February 1987, MITI began issuing "requests" for
production cutbacks which were met by the following
month. But then it was too late. Oki Electric was lured
into documenting sales at less than fair market value in
Hong Kong.
The American Congress voted to retaliate for violations
of the price floor agreement and the Reagan administrati-
on announced the imposition of 100 percent tariffs on
$300 million on Japanese exports of power tools, compu-
ters, and TV sets to the US. Tariffs were deliberately
not set on semiconductors themselves because they were
essential to so many American businesses.
The retaliation had two apparent effects.
1) The US share of the Japanese market began to rise;
2) The prices of chips began to rise, probably related to
anticipated trade policy actions by the US government. As
a result, Japanese chips cost American computer manufac-
turers 30% to 40% more than before the SCTA. Personel
computer prices shot up drastically in the late 1980s,
almost destroying America’s competitiveness in this high-
tech product area.
By the fall of 1987 the price increases were beginning to
seriously hurt chip users, particularly the computer
firms. The US government reversed course and asked MITI
to abandon the price production controls and in November
1987 it partially removed the spring sanctions.
MITI complied but continued to impose strict restrictions
under COCOM (the international agreement aimed at con-
trolling the diffusion of sensitive technologies to the
Soviet bloc). This had the effect of maintaining the
system of administered prices. MITI continued to provide
"opinions" to the Japanese firms as to their investment
plans.
Even after MITI ended its guidance and the chip market
began to weaken in 1989, Japanese producers implemented
cutbacks in DRAM production to boost prices and they made
excessive profits on global sales. These rents further
improved the Japanese firms’ competitive position, not
only in chips but potentially in downstream products such
as computers and telecommunications equipment, through
cross-subsidies. R&D expenditures in chips in Japan
exceeded those in the US by $2 billion in 1988.
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Coincident with the SCTA was increased activity by US
firms to penetrate the Japanese market. This was accompa-
nied by a plethora of tieups and joint activities between
Japanese and US firms.
It is difficult to say how many of these were due to the
SCTA and how many would have occurred anyway in response
to business conditions.
By the SCTA’s deadline in 1991, the market access target
of 20% had not been met, so that in the summer of 1991,
US and Japan entered a new round of negotiations on
semiconductor trade. The US government was under mounting
pressure from domestic producers to take a more aggressi-
ve stance in trade negotiations.
From the past it had become evident that when threatened
with retaliatory tariffs, Japanese manufacturers are
inclined to take steps to increase marginally imports of
US semiconductors. However, at the same time there was
little evidence of a fundamental restructuring of indus-
trial practice among Japanese electronics firms, the
majority of which continued to source semiconductors from
domestic suppliers.
In August 1991 a second five-year agreement was signed
between the USA and Japan, which endorsed the existing
target of a 20% market share for USA producers by the end
of 1992.
The agreement abandoned the flawed policy of price
floors. However, Japanese firms were still required to
collect production cost information to be provided to the
US government on occasion of future dumping charges.
With price floors removed, the price of DRAMS fell
substantially during 1991-92, driven down in large part
by emergent South Korean producers.
In reaction to both trade agreements US semiconductor
firms increased their share of the Japanese market from
8.6% in 1986 to 14.4% in the third quarter of 1991.
At the end of 1992 US market share reached 20.2%,
resulting from a modest rise in the purchase of foreign
semiconductors and from a shrinkage in the total market
for semiconductors in Japan. US and Japanese firms were
virtually tied for the lead in worldwide chip sales, with
each accounting for 43% of the total.
The trade agreements were actually quite narrow in scope.
While the market access provisions were generic, the
antidumping provisions of the first SCTA affected only
one segment of the entire semiconductor industry, i.e.,
DRAMs and to a lesser extent EPROMs.
The dumping provisions secured their immediate goal of
forcing Japanese firms to raise prices on DRAMs. However,
the consequences of this price increase were largely
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negative for US firms.
There is widespread consensus that the price floor part
of the SCTA was a mistake: it harmed non-Japanese
downstream users, while transferring large rents to
Japanese firms.
Since the imposed price floor did not take account of the
learning-curve nature of this industry, this part of the
Agreement almost surely did more harm to US industrial
interests than it did to Japanese industrial interests.
By the time prices began to rise, all of the major US
manufacturers had already withdrawn from DRAM production.
Rather than benefiting US firms, therefore, the high
prices created windfall profits (estimated at $5 billion)
for Japanese producers. Much of these profits were
deployed to support an expanded program of R&D and
capital investment that further undermined the
competitive position of US firms.
Both antidumping and the market access issues illustrate
how trade policy can be driven by a coalition of a few
vocal firms. The bargaining stance taken by the US Trade
representative (USTR) was the position held by the SIA
and then the SIA & Computer Systems Policy Project
(CSPP), which had effective veto power over any
agreement. The trade negotiators themselves proved
incapable of any independent conception of what sorts of
policies would best serve the interests of the economy
overall.
MITI played a key role in facilitating the reductions in
output by Japanese semiconductor firms by closely
monitoring demand and production conditions. Thus, one
effect of the price floor provision of the SCTA was to
increase MITI’s control over the Japanese economy. The
revival of MITI is one of the unintended consequences of
the US movement toward a system of managed trade.
In this respect US policy seems caught in a contradictory
position, at one time during the mid-1970s asking for
less involvement by MITI, and on another occasion in 1986
asking for more.
The agreement created a breathing space within which US
firms could address their underlying problems of
production quality, yields, and turnaround time on new
products. Japan’s success in producing homogeneous DRAMs
pushed US firms into product differentiated markets where
they enjoy greater markups and face less direct
competition.
In the 1990s US firms were positioned for further
recovery. By emphasizing the rapid development and
deployment of advanced design-intensive devices, US firms
have avoided much of the intense price competition in
high-volume commodity markets and have managed to
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establish a leadership position in emerging product-lines
such as mixed-signal devices and RISC microprocessors.
The stabilization of market share reflected a fundamental
restructuring of the US semiconductor industry.
The first theme emerging is the increasing "Japanization"
of US manufacturing systems, involving much closer
cooperative ties among customers, producers and equipment
suppliers and the creation of multidimensional product
teams. The result has been a convergence of the
manufacturing performance of US and Japanese firms.
The second change is the increasing integration and
physical combination of technology development and
production within US semiconductor firms allowing a more
rapid deployment of new technologies and the achievement
of enhanced yields in production.
For much of the 1980s, the restructuring of the US
semiconductor industry was dominated less by changes in
manufacturing practice than by the redeployment of
resources away from DRAMs and other devices (where Japan
is dominant) into value-added, more design-intensive
product markets, such as microprocessors, mixed-signal
devices and very fast logic devices.
This implies a search for markets in which the innovative
capability of US firms in product design offsets Japanese
leadership in high-volme manufacturing and process
technology.
Much of the apparent improvement of US semiconductor and
equipment firms in the past two years may be traced to
the declining fortunes of the Japanese semiconductor
producers. Domestic competition in Japan and entry by
other Asia/Pacific producers have reduced the
profitability of semiconductor memory chips, the Japanese
strongest area.
According to reports in the US mass media, American chip
manufacturers had lost interest in gaining a 20 percent
share in Japan even before the semiconductor talks in
1986 opened. Due to the enormous amount of money being
poured into research and development, more and more,
Japanese and US chip makers were putting aside their past
rivalry and forming cooperative alliances for self-
defense, such as:
- AT&T with NEC;
- Texas Instruments with Hitachi;
- Motorola with Toshiba;
- Sanyo with LSI Logic;
- Intel and Matsushita;
- Advanced micro devices and Sony.
If relationships of this sort prosper, then at least one
Japanese-American trade sore may have healed itself.
Few American chip companies want to jeopardise the
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collaboration that they have established with Japan’s
electronic giants. The SIA quietly says that they will
not press for reprisals if Japan fails to hit its 20%
target.
Today the US semiconductor industry is more competitive
and prosperous than it was before the SCTA. It now is the
world’s largest producer of semiconductors. America’s
renewed success in Japan has occurred because of private
sector initiatives by US and Japanese companies to work
together in strategic alliances and joint ventures and
despite the US government’s managed trade policies. In
1991 there were fewer than a dozen such partnerships
between US and Japanese companies. In 1994, there were
more than three dozen. US - Japanese joint ventures and
strategic alliances are the principal reason not only for
America regaining its role as the largest producer of
semiconductors in the world, but also for America’s
increased market share in Japan.
In this sense it is ironic that Japanese and American
businesses are seeking ways to co-exist and cooperate in
high technology, despite the ups and downs in Japan-US
political relations.
6.4. Renewal of the SCTA?
Until this very moment (mid July 1996) the achievements
of the semiconductor trade policy of the USA have been
limited according to the Americans. The 20% target
represented a relatively modest market share. Even though
this immediate goal has been met, there is little
evidence of a structural change in trading relations
according to the US. Therefore, additional aggressive
intervention, ("cautious activism") by the US government
is not unlikely.
In contrast to the Bush administration, which tried to
win trade concessions by demanding reciprocity, the
Clinton administration uses the principle of comparable
access with market share as the yardstick by which the
efficacy of its trading partners’ market opening efforts
are measured.
Since March 1995, US Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale,
US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, Commerce Secretary
Ronald Brown, (who was killed in a plain accident in
April 1996 and has been succeeded by Kantor, while Kantor
in his turn has been succeeded by Charlene Barshefsky),
Vice Presicent Al Gore, Secretary of State Warren
Christopher, and Presicent Clinton have all issued
statements supporting extension of the SCTA. The
Presisent said that "the current agreement held great
potential for further progress and that the US would
continue to actively pursue its renewal."
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The Clinton Administration believes that the recent
success of America’s semiconductor industry is the result
of the SCTA. However, it is not. The US semiconductor
industry is successful today because it sought joint
ventures with Japanese firms which gave American firms
access to the Japanese market.
It is hard to picture a US industry less in need of
government assistance. The US semiconductor industry is
made up of companies with strong earnings and a bright
future, not companies that are in need of assistance from
the federal government in the form of an affirmative
action program to help them sell products to Japan. Given
the last decade’s massive changes, US producers would
seem to have little to complain about regarding access to
Japan or, indeed, any other country in the world. With
high prices and record profits, the American companies
would seem to have nothing to complain about regarding
dumping. These two facts alone remove the entire raison
d’être for the renewal of the semiconductor agreement.
The best rationale supporters of renewal offer is that an
extension is somehow necessary to preserve and
consolidate past gains by the US industry, what might be
dubbed the "chicken soup" argument (as in: it could not
hurt).
In 1996 the USTR is replaying the old 1986 mantra. In
calling for renewal of the SCTA the Clinton
Administration and the SIA point out there is a gap
between the US market share in Japan and the US market
share in the rest of the world outside Japan. The US has
nearly 50% of the world market outside of Japan (48% to
be exact) and only 17.9% of the market inside Japan. This
gap, the SIA argues, shows that the USA market share in
Japan is less than what it should be if the Japanese
market were fully open. Therefore, the SCTA which is set
to expire on July 31, 1996, should be extended to address
the continuing barriers in the Japanese semiconductor
market.
However, the Japanese argue that this market share gap is
misleading, showing nothing about the openness of the
Japanese semiconductor market. The relative high
percentage of 48% results form the fact that the US
industry has a very large share of the US market.
American chip manufacfurers are the dominant suppliers to
semiconductor users in the US, which causes the US share
of the world outside of Japan to increase significantly.
Not surprisingly, Japan has a virtually identical share
of the world market outside the US, 47%, again,
principally because Japanese chipmakers have a large
share of their home market. And the Japanese share in the
US, 23%, is roughly comparable to the US market share in
Japan, 17.9%. Thus, the infamous market share gap is
basically the same for both countries.
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A variation on the market share gap argument is that the
SIA looks to the neutral markets outside Japan, i.e.,
Asia and Europe. There, taken together, the US has
approximately 40% market share and the SIA compares this
to its 17.9% market share in Japan to conclude that the
Japanese market is not fully open.
Again this argument is misleading because Europe is not a
neutral market. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Europeans
focused on the systems end of the marekt and left much of
the manufacturing of semiconductors to others, inviting
American chipmakers to set up production facilities in
Europe while setting up high tariff walls against foreign
imported chips. For this historical reason, American
semiconductor firms have long held a high market share in
Europe. Americans have a 45% market share in Europe,
while Japanese companies have a 20% share.
The US position suggests fixing the current 30% level as
the floor and measuring ongoing "progress" to infinitely
expand foreign market share in Japan.
Moreover, at this moment, the SIA ignores its earlier
assertion, made in 1990, that the 20% market share
contained in the SCTA was a threshold after which market
forces should be permitted to take over and operate. But
now, with foreign market share at nearly 30%, the SIA
wants even more, arguing that its market share would be
much higher.
Therefore, Japanese trade negotiators strongly resist
market share goals as a measure of trade performance.
Especially in conditions of recession they do not want to
be confronted with import obligations. They seek to shift
attention to less tangible indicators of the trading
relationships, such as the strength of partnerships
between US and Japanese firms.
Moreover, it is widely believed in Japan that Japan had
overtaken the US in advanced technology. It was so
difficult to increase the share of US computer chips in
the Japanese market to 20 percent because Japanese
companies did not like to be forced to buy "second-rate"
US semiconductors instead of "first-rate" Japanese
products.
Now the government of Japan proposes a new multilateral
forum to replace the current US-Japan arrangement, which
will expire on 31 July 1996. The Japanese market is now
fully open; the foreign market share in Japan for
semiconductors has more than tripled over the past ten
years from 9% in 1986 to more than 30% today. The market
for semiconductors has become global. There has been
dramatic growth in international business partnerships
and a tremendous expansion of the Asian semiconductor
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industry. Japanese firms now work side by side with their
foreign partners in all aspects of semiconductor
development, production and marketing. Given the
borderless nature of many operations in this industry,
the era in which it made sense to distinguish the
"nationality" of a semiconductor chip, has long since
passed.
A multilateral approach is essential, as a bilateral
agreement can no longer adequately address the evolving
requirements of a dynamic, rapidly changing global
industry. The Japanese government is proposing the
formation of a "Global Governmental Forum on the
Semiconductor Industry", with the US, Japan and the
European Union as founding members.
The overall conclusion is that it is an unfortunate fact
of life that legislation often requires one step backward
for every two steps forward. The Amercian insistence on
renewal of the SCTA is one such instance, and free
traders should accept that political reality and not
allow the best to be the enemy of the better.
Rather than rely on managing and regulating international
trade from Washington and Tokyo, the Clinton
Administration would do well to step aside and allow the
SCTA to expire on its own accord. In its place is a solid
foundation of private business partnerships that have
made American companies more competitive and more
profitable.
6.5. Evaluation of the SCTA: the VIE as a new form of
managed trade.
Given the innovative nature of the SCTA and the obvious
interest in applying this approach to other sectoral
disputes, a careful evaluation is warranted.
1) Considerable dispute arose over the extent to which
price floors were to be applied to sales in third-country
markets. The SCTA was the first bilateral deal to
explicitly involve monitoring of third-party markets.
The USA announced sanctions against third-country dumping
applied to Japan.
In reaction, the Japanese government through MITI kept
pressure ("provided guidance") on firms to hold
production and investment in new capacity down and this
brought third-country prices up to US levels.
2) A point overlooked by the Americans was that Japanese
suppliers choose to cooperate rather than compete. Since
the SCTA Japanese DRAM manufacturers moved from competing
for market share to market sharing. Japanese chip
producers were collectively cutting back production to
achieve high price stabilization. In the DRAM market they
established a temporary price floor benefiting all
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Japanese suppliers which earned bubble profits of $4
billion between 1987 and 1991. Whether cause or effect of
the SCTA, at the very least the SCTA played a catalytic
role in this move toward production coordination.
In contrast, in the EPROM market, where non-Japanese
suppliers held 40% of het market, there was no effective
cooperation among the Japanese suppliers.
Although there is no direct evidence to examine the
credibility of allegations of this collusive behavior,
fact is that in early 1988 spot prices for DRAMs in the
US soared to historically unprecedented levels and the US
computer industry was plunged into crisis; producers
scrambled for supplies of critical memory chips.
3) In the SCTA’s antidumping provisions the Japanese
agreed to increase their prices, in return of which the
USA dropped their dumping charges.
However, the American computer industry strongly opposed
the antidumping provisions because it had been harmed by
the sharp runup in DRAM prices. Therefore, in DRAMs de
SCTA’s antidumping provisions actually made matters
worse, by creating a price floor policy which made the US
a high-cost production location. The SCTA has put
downstream users of semiconductors at a competitive
disadvantage.
Unfortunately a similar pattern of development appears to
be occurring in liquid crystal displays (LCDs), a type of
flat panel display.
In EPROMs the antidumping provisions were applied early
enough to deter dumping and to encourage competition,
while in the DRAM market they were applied late with the
anticompetitive effect of encouraging cooperation among
Japanese suppliers.
An alternative to antidumping duties could have been a
countervailing US subsidy to offset the injury to US DRAM
producers. But this was a nonstarter given the
ideological and budgetary climate prevailing in the US in
1986.
4) The market access provisions are more controversial.
The original SCTA was a departure in US trade policy. It
sought to expand US access to a foreign high-technology
product market, rather than reduce foreign access to the
US market. It became the first US example of a voluntary
import expansion (VIE) measure.
VIEs are designed to increase trade and competition in
countries in which structural impediments limit access
for foreign suppliers.
There is opposition to VIEs because they result in the
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cartelization of markets; they increase prices by
limiting competition; they are subject to capture by
producer interests in the importing or exporting country;
they increase the risks of retaliation if the targets are
not met; they can create dangerous precedents that could
come back to haunt the demandeur and they violate the
principle of non-discrimination.
VIEs are second-best policy remedies because unimpeded
market competition is the first-best approach, but may be
superior to doing nothing.
Whether a VIE is globally welfare-enhancing comes down to
whether the initial situation is distorted or not, and if
it is, how.
i) If the foreign market is protected and a VIE is
implemented on a nonpreferential basis among foreign
suppliers, the VIE may be globally welfare-enhancing,
although producers in the protected country will lose.
If one considers the pre-SCTA situation as a distorted
one in which large Japanese firms used rents to cross-
subsidize the chip production, the VIE is welfare
enhancing from both a US and global standpoint, as well
as for Japanese consumers.
ii) If the market is protected and the VIE is
administered preferentially, it is possible that both the
importing and the exporting countries as a whole may gain
at the expense of third-country producers.
iii) If the market is initially undistorted, the VIE will
reduce importing-country welfare and increase exporting-
country welfare. In an undistorted market the VIE
introduces a distortion, which benefits US and other non-
Japanese chip firms, while reducing the welfare of
consumers.
Therefore, the welfare impact of the SCTA comes down to
whether the Japanese market was initially protected, and
whether the agreement facilitated an anticompetitive
cartel in semiconductors.
Clearly, by 1986 traditional border protection in Japan
was minimal, so that the case for a VIE had to be made on
the basis of private practices that discriminated against
imports.
It may be argued that keiretsu links provide considerable
scope for trade discrimination, having a well-known
efficiency cost. However, this claim of keiretsu barriers
has to be examined very carefully.
Firms that do not source from the most efficient
suppliers will themselves be put at a competitive
disadvantage. Since Japanese electronics firms do compete
in world markets, this argument is incorrect or there are
other barriers in the production system which generate
rents for the electronics firms.
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Therefore, there are a few criteria for deciding whether
VIEs will enhance world economic welfare:
a) there is strong evidence of barriers to market access,
even if a specific, tangible barrier cannot be
identified;
b) foreign firms and products are demonstrably
competitive;
c) the best option, that is removing the market-access
barrier, is not available (e.g. improved antitrust
enforcement);
d) the products in question are intermediate, not
consumer, goods;
e) VIEs are implemented on an MFN basis.
Following Irwin (1994) several lessons emerge from the
experience with the SCTA.
I) VIE import targets are arbitrary on several
dimensions.
The particular commodities that come under the scope of a
VIE are arbitrary. The broader the industrial aggregate
chosen for an import target, the more arbitrary the VIE
becomes by including different types of goods.
US competitors are not necessarily competitive in all
product segments and not all those segments may be
appropriate to the needs of the foreign market.
II) If explicit government restrictions are not apparent,
one can never be sure whether hidden or informal barriers
do in fact exist.
Low market shares alone cannot be accepted as prima facie
evidence of discriminatory practices.
There is no reliable economic basis for determining the
foreign market share without the alleged discrimination.
No satisfactory methodology can calculate the target
market share; the choice of which is therefore inherently
arbitrary and devoid of any serious economic foundation.
III) The market share targets have been proposed as
temporary indicators. However, when the market share
reached its target of 20% at the end of 1992, the SIA
urged that the import target be maintained, if not
increased.
Any shortfall is ground for complaint by the USA and any
increase is hailed by Japan as progress.
IV) VIEs raise the issue of enforcement. To be credible,
the VIE must be backed by the implicit or explicit threat
of retaliation in case of noncompliance.
There is an inherent uncertainty surrounding the import
target. The problem is whether failure to satisfy the
import target is evidence of Japanese recalcitrance or is
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the target set at the wrong level, or has the composition
of demand in the foreign market changed?
V) VIEs diminish competition.
If no explicit government barriers have been identified,
enforcement of the VIE target is unlikely to enhance
competition.
The SCTA has clearly altered the nature of competition in
the semiconductor industry as indicated by the
proliferation of joint ventures between the US and
Japanese firms since 1986.
The manifold joint ventures have diminished the high
degree of rivalry between US and Japanese firms.
VIEs may not increase competition but merely create rents
for the first few foreign firms that are beneficiaries of
the action, especially if they are imperfectly
competitive and recognize their bargaining power vis-à-
vis their Japanese customers and if they already have
long-standing direct investments in Japan with selling
advantages over other US rivals.
Even if as a result of a VIE additional firms enter the
market, this does not necessarily increase competition.
If there are fixed market shares, (that is not
competition), this share agreement implies cartelization.
The VIE may be a facilitating practice that fosters
collusion, just like VERs. The act of the Japanese
government forcing Japanese firms to reduce their
domestic sales and to share the market with foreign
rivals has given rise to a more coordinated and more
collusive interplay between foreign and Japanese firms.
In the end, competition has not been enhanced, only
profits are shared.
VI) VIEs are likely to become managed trade in the worst
sense. They require substantial government intervention
to become effective, depending on explicit and continual
administrative or enforcement actions. Imports must be
rationed and allocated among domestic consumers to
satisfy the market share target. Results-based trade
policy is not about opening markets at all; it is about
granting special favors to prominent and politically
powerful US industries.
VII) VIEs may degenerate into discriminatory and
preferential treatment for certain suppliers, leading to
trade diversion, constituting export protectionism for
one’s own (in this case US) producers.
The SCTA was officially nondiscriminatory since it
referred to foreign capital-affiliated semiconductor
firms, not simply to US firms. In 1988 the EU lost a GATT
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panel decision challenging the SCTA as a violation of
MFN.
Despite formal assurances to the contrary, there is ample
reason to believe that VIEs will continue as an explicit
discriminatory device in favor of the USA. In negotiating
a new automobile and auto parts VIE, the Clinton
administration proposed "specific expectations" for
greater Japanese imports specifically of American-owned
companies.
However, the Japanese government and firms interpret the
VIE as encouraging imports principally from the USA.
Japan recognizes that the pressure to import more arises
almost exclusively from the USA.
Other countries interpret the VIE as a preference to US
firms. Therefore, the EU has pressed for an own market
share target of 5% in Japan. Its market share in Japan
was only 1%, while its share outside Europe and Japan is
5%.
VIII) VIEs make a country believe that it can achieve
market opening without reciprocal liberalization,
reducing support for the open multilateral system. As the
setting of import targets by two countries is perceived
by other countries as fixing market shares to their
detriment, bilateral trade restrictions tend to spread.
This tends to carve up world markets by political fiat
and pressure.
VIEs are inherently bilateral and damage third countries.
Smaller and weaker countries with less political and
economic influence are left behind to fight over the
remaining scraps of the market. This threatens the WTO
system.
IX) The VIE exacerbates the political capture of US trade
policy and reduces the role of the government as an agent
for interest groups.
The USA indeed has a producer-oriented complainant-
initiated trade policy system, in which domestic
exporting interests lobbied for the VIE. During the
negotiation of the 1986 SCTA, SIA representatives were
often in the next room and received frequent updates from
US negotiators about the status of the talks. The SIA had
veto power over the agreement.
Moreover, there is the question of what criteria are used
in picking and choosing the industries to benefit from US
government action. The arbitrary nature of selecting
industries for VIEs raises the possibility that political
pressure results in the wrong sectors chosen for a VIE.
This may reduce welfare if there is an expansion in
output from a sector benefiting from a government
subsidy.
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An increase in US exports does not correspond with an
increase in economic welfare. In a price-distorted sector
the distortion may be magnified, reducing welfare.
The danger is that US trade policy may simply mirror the
concerns of the most vocal complainants with little
consideration of the nation’s economic interest.
VIEs will exacerbate this trend and will encourage
greater lobbying for export protectionism.
An example is the case of Micron Technology which in
April 1992 filed an antidumping petition against South
Korea. In October, the Commerce Department announced
dumping margins as high as 87% against Samsung, Goldstar
and Hyundai.
The Korean government offered to sign an agreement
committing itself to a VIE, but it was rejected by the
Clinton administration, because Micron vetoed the Korean
proposal. It felt secure behind high antidumping duties
imposed against Korea and was unaffected by the
prospective Korean market-opening actions.
Active use of VIEs in US trade policy would reinforce the
grossly exaggerated notion that foreign unfair trade
practices are a prominent feature of international trade.
An estimate of the increase in US exports that would
arise if Japan fully liberalizes its trade is about $13.6
billion, roughly equal to a quarter of US bilateral trade
deficit with Japan, 2% of US exports and 0.2% of US GDP
in 1992.
The completion of the Uruguay Round is reckoned to
increase US income by about $20 billion annually, but
this figure does not receive the public attention that
trade disputes with Japan do.
The intense obsession and focus on Japan’s hidden
practices reinforces the faulty notion that Japan can be
blamed for the economic shortcomings of the USA.
US trade policy is again taking on the tenor of a
statement made in 1985 by Senator Joseph Biden: "I don’t
want to compete, I just want to win".
Blaming unfair discrimination abroad or unfair practices
for one’s own economic shortcomings is an easy way to
avoiding serious discussion of domestic solutions.
If the USA wants to reduce its current acount deficit,
reduction of the fiscal deficit and the promotion of
domestic savings are a vastly superior approach to VIEs.
Once its own house is in order, the political pressures
for the management of international trade will subside.
5) Another point of criticism on the SCTA concerns the
arbitrary nature of the 20% target, so that the
negotiated outcome could be inferior to what would
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prevail if the underlying barrier to exports could be
removed.
For chips the 20 percent market share appears to have
been a lower-bound estimate of what the foreign producer
market share would have been if the Japanese market were
like markets elsewhere in the world. (In 1986, US firms
had a 40% share of European market and a 66% share of the
world market excluding Japan.)
In the wake of the SCTA total sales of semiconductors by
North American firms in Japan grew from $1.2 billion in
1987 to $2.8 billion in 1991, with a 23% growth rate for
North American sales in Japan versus 11.2% growth rate of
the total Japanese market over this period.
This increase has been attributed to shifts in the
composition of demand in Japan and to technological
innovations by US firms (such as the development of the
486 chip by Intel). However, the latter hypothesis is
difficult to assess and the former does not appear to be
supported by the data.
The market segment where North American presence was
greatest, namely, bipolar digital logic chips, actually
shrank between 1987 and 1991. Rather, US firms increased
their shares in the most rapidly growing part of the
market, that is in MOS memory chips, MOS logic chips and
MOS microcomponents. This may be interpreted as
supporting the notion that entry is easiest in expanding
sectors, where domestic firms may not be able to meet
demand and where imports do not directly displace
existing domestic production.
Total US exports to Japan increased from $384 million to
$969 million, with a growth rate of 26%.
Therefore, data do indicate that the growth rate of US
exports actually exceeded the growth rate of sales by
North American firms. However, caution is warranted in
making comparisons between data on sales and those on
exports; they are from two different sources, product
definitions may differ and the sales data include
Canadian firms. Hence, the results for sales by US firms
do not necessarily hold for exports from the US.
Recall that, under the SCTA, the nationality of a product
was determined by the producer’s headquarters, not the
location of production. Therefore, a TI chip produced in
Japan is counted as American and a Hitachi chip produced
in the US is counted as Japanese for the purpose of
calculating market shares.
The absolute increase in exports was greatest in bipolar
devices, while the growth rate was greatest in MOS memory
devices. The same enormous increases did not occur in
microprocessors, so that technological innovations did
59
not generate the growth in US semiconductor exports.
Taken together, the data on sales and exports do not
support the contention that the increase in foreign
market share has been due largely to either shifts in
demand toward market segments of high foreign penetration
or technological innovation in semiconductors.
The question is how much of this increased foreign
activity can be ascribed to the SCTA?
Bergsten and Noland (1993) argue that if the foreigners
had merely maintained their market shares in Japan and if
bipolar devices (where North American firm share of sales
actually declined) are excluded and the North American
market shares in 1987 are applied to each segment of the
Japanese market in 1991, the predicted sales would have
been $1.4 billion.
In fact, sales were $2.5 billion. The difference of $1.1
billion could be interpreted as an upper-bound estimate
of the impact of the SCTA. This is an upper-bound
estimate because it ascribes all market gains to the SCTA
and not to other factors such as technological
innovations or changes in exchange rates.
A similar calculation has been done with respect to US
exports. If the share of US exports in each product
category (including bipolar devices, where their share
increased) had remained constant between 1987 and 1991,
US exports would have been $457 million, while in fact
exports were $872 million (excluding other devices with
$97 million), yielding $415 million as an upperbound
estimate of the SCTA’s effect.
These calculations suggest that the impact of the SCTA
was to nearly double US chip exports between 1987 and
1991.
6) The SCTA does not guarantee that the 20% level be
maintained and whether it can depends on how far the US
chip producers can persuade Japanese electronics
producers to design-in US components for their products
in the long run.
7) A lesson of the SCTA is that sustained US pressure
backed by credible commitments to sanctions is often
necessary to secure Japan’s adherence to a formal trade
agreement that threatens the interests of powerful
Japanese companies.
8) The SCTA’s greatest benefit of the USA in the long run
may be substantial foreign direct investment by Japanese
firms in the USA, which has sparked a heated policy
controversy.
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FDI is not just a substitute for trade, it drives trade
as well. FDI opens up a wedge that often expands trade as
subsystems and production equipment are shipped from the
home country to the host country where production takes
place. FDI may also stimulate exports from the host
country as foreign firms buy into a source of product.
Proponents of FDI point to benefits in the form of jobs,
capital, technological know how and local externalities.
Moreover, greater competition reduces prices for
consumers.
Opponents emphasize three possible disadvantages of FDI.
1) By establishing early mover advantages it may displace
or deter or discourage the entry or expansion of US-owned
companies.
2) FDI may reduce market competition by buying out
domestic competitors directly or by squeezing them out
gradually, so that a more concentrated industry may
result.
3) FDI may threaten national security by transferring
control over key military technologies to foreign firms.
In case due to FDI national security is at stake two
principles should be followed to enhance control over
foreign suppliers.
1) Performance requirements on foreign investors for
national ownership or, local production by foreign
suppliers should be used.
2) A diversity of suppliers should be sought to maintain
a competitive supply base.
However, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US
(CFIUS) was not seriously concerned about the potential
national security threat posed by the Japanese control
over the semiconductor industry.
Ultimately, FDI should be evaluated against its
counterfactual: what would be the result if the FDI did
not take place?
FDI is preferable when the alternative is increasing
dependency on imports or in case of failure to develop a
new technology because of limited domestic capital or
manufacturing capabilities.
It may be concluded that investment by domestic companies
may be the first best outcome. If not available, FDI is
second best.
The size of the FDI activities of Japanese semiconductor
firms in advanced countries rests on their technological
leadership in semiconductor technologies, that is MOS
memory. Japanese firms felt threatened by the imminent
protectionism arising in the USA and undertook FDI there.
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Policymakers should be aware that policy efforts to
exclude or ward off imports may accelerate rather than
decelerate market penetration by the Japanese.
6.6. Deficiency of cost-based definition of dumping .
The basis for the dumping decision of the ITC has been
the subject of some controversy because the low prices
charged by Japanese firms were a normal feature of
semiconductor pricing over the product cycle rather than
the result of dumping and were consistent with the goal
of maximizing profits over the full product cycle of each
generation.
It can be argued that the procurement behavior of the
vertically integrated Japanese electronics firms prior to
the SCTA reflects economically rational behavior where an
upstream component (chips) is subject to scale economies.
Vertically integrated firms will tend to source inputs
internally in products such as chips that are
characterized by huge fixed costs and significant
learning curves over the product cycle, but this is
efficient and not a trade impediment per se, as argued by
the US negotiators.
The criterion to determine whether or not imports have
been dumped in the USA was a constructed "fair value"
concept. The most widely publicized application of this
standard was in the case of imports from Japan of DRAM
semiconductors in 1985.
Although prices for these chips in the US market actually
have been marginally higher than prevailing prices in the
Japanese market, (the exact opposite of the traditional
concept of dumping as sales abroad at less than home
market prices), the US complainant charged that Japanese
chips were being sold at prices not covering the full
costs of production, the new definition of dumping in the
US trade laws.
According to US antidumping law a good is "dumped" if it
is sold somewhere else for a higher price, or if it is
sold below what the US Department of Commerce (DOC)
defines as average cost plus an 8% markup for normal
profit. Pricing below this constructed long-run average
cost has become the principal grounds for applying the
dumping laws to US imports of foreign products.
The economic motivation for antidumping laws that led to
this situation is that they prevent anti-competitive
strategic behavior called predatory pricing.
If a firm sells below cost for long enough, it may drive
its competitors out of the market leaving it free to
charge high monopoly prices in the future. This is
especially irksome when the predator is foreign since the
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monopoly profits do not accrue to domestic residents.
However, predatory pricing is not always a good idea.
Think of the losses of the predator as an investment. The
firm must expect higher than normal profits after it has
driven out the competition - high enough to cover the
cost of the predation.
The key to profitable predation is the existence of
barriers that prevent other firms from entering or
reentering the market when the predator jacks up his
prices.
It is sometimes asserted that the learning curve provides
just the sort of entry barrier that would make predatory
pricing profitable. Hard evidence is difficult to come
by, but anecdotal evidence suggests that this be
incorrect.
It seems that entry and reentry are too easy in the
semiconductor market to make predatory pricing
worthwhile. Therefore, is seems unlikely that Japanese
firms would have pursued such a strategy, at least for
profit motives.
The economic problem with cost-based definitions of
dumping is their use of the wrong cost concept, long-run
average cost instead of short-run marginal cost.
The DOC’s "Foreign Market Value (FMV ) concept is based
strictly on average cost pricing and admits no role for
the type of forward pricing that is normal in a learning
curve industry like the semiconductor industry.
In an industry subject to learning economies (where unit
production cost falls with cumulative production
experience) it is possible that producers may rationally
choose to "forward price", that is sell at a price below
current marginal cost for completely competitive
nonstrategic reasons. In that case it may be argued that
a criterion based on marginal cost might serve as a
useful screen for potentially predatory behavior by
foreign exporters.
In the absence of learning effects, pricing below short-
run marginal cost is sufficient to conclude that a firm
is acting strategically.
However, some cautiousness is required here.
When fixed investments in R&D are very large in relation
to a firm’s sales, such as in the semiconductor industry
which spends almost 15% of sales on R&D, there is a
significant gap between average variable cost and long-
run average cost, and short-run marginal cost may fall
significantly below long-run average cost.
Then, perfectly competitive behavior may often trigger
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pricing below long-run average costs. This is because an
R&D investment is generally charged against revenue at
the moment it is incurred, (this is called "front
loading" of R&D), and not spread over its economically
useful life.
Moreover, the FMV concept does not consider the fact that
since demand in this market is elastic, the free trade
price path must fall more slowly than the average cost
path. The FMV calculation had made no provision for the
fact that normal competitive firms initially may price
below average cost, but above variable costs, when faced
with an unexpected downturn in demand.
In this respect two questions may be posed:
1) Should pricing below fair value when making learning
investments be a violation of the predatory behavior
provisions of the US Trade Act?
2) Were the Japanese firms acting in a predatory fashion
during 1985-1986 or is pricing below fair market value as
determined by the Department of Commerce an indication of
learning-associated investments?
ad1) The investment associated with learning is like any
other investment in cost-reducing technology and yields
exactly the same sort of efficiencies so long as the
investments are taken to the appropriate margin.
It is easy to miss the point that such investments are
efficiency-creating when there is little recognition of
the potentially-significant difference between static and
full costs with learning and one must understand that
firms attempt to use the correct, full marginal cost
including the present value of learning effects in their
decisions.
ad 2) While the ITC found that many Japanese companies
were selling their semiconductors in the US at prices
below their production costs, there is little evidence
that this was done to undercut the prices of US
producers. Instead, it was more the result of intensive
competition within Japan and a drop in demand for
personal computers in the mid-1980s, which caused the
prices for chips to fall rapidly. In order to cut their
losses, many Japanese semiconductor firms which had
overproduced and had bulging inventories sought to cut
their losses by quickly selling off their stockpiles.
Next figure helps to explain that Japanese semiconductor
manufacturers might have expanded output by investing in
learning and that neither the Department of Commerce nor
the ITC have developed the data necessary to investigate
this possibility in the US Trade Act of 1974
proceedings.
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This figure shows that below fair market pricing by the
Japanese was simply an indication of learning-associated
investments, whereby the American authorities reached an
incorrect conclusion.
In case there is no learning the product will be sold at
price P s where marginal revenue and static marginal costs
equal. The price is above static marginal cost and also
above average total cost, providing profits. A section
301 violation of the Trade Act would not be found under
these conditions.
If there are significant opportunities for learning the
relevant marginal cost schedule is MC full and the firm
produces the greater quantity sold at price P l . This
output expansion involves a current investment in
learning equal to the difference between P l and average
cost times output q l .
While the firm is investing at the proper margin to
reduce its future costs, the fact that price P l is below
the calculated fair value at this greater output (AC +
8%) means that a trade violation under Section 301 would
be invoked. In this case the price is confused with
predatory pricing while the firm legitimately attempted
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to capture economies of learning by doing.
Therefore, in the presence of learning economies, below
marginal-cost pricing can be rational. A rational firm
will generally equate marginal revenue to a value below
its current short-run marginal cost, as it takes into
account the cost-reducing effect of current production on
future production costs.
Chip prices typically drop very quickly over the first
part of the product cycle, drop less quickly as the
product approaches maturity, and fall very slowly, if at
all, at the end. In this case rational firms engage in
"forward pricing", that is choose output levels where
marginal revenue lies below their current short-run
marginal cost, or marginal revenue equal terminal (not
current) marginal cost.
This does not necessarily mean that price falls below
current marginal cost since price will in general exceed
marginal revenue.
It may be concluded that in case of learning by doing
stategically pricing (to influence the behavior of
rivals) below marginal cost is normal business practice
that should not be condemned as dumping or predation.
A policy measure that prohibits marginal cost pricing by
foreign exporters will increase domestic production at
the expense of domestic consumers. By so doing foreign
producers are denied national treatment in the importing
country and are forbidden the right to economic behavior
which is permitted to domestic firms.
In HT sectors in the presence of scale and learning
economies there is a strong incentive for forward pricing
by setting current prices on the basis of future cost. It
is very difficult to distinguish between forward pricing
and predatory pricing. This has to be established by
careful consideration of cost and demand characteristics
in a particular industry.
In many countries national antidumping rules do not
require the determination of predatory intent or of
market power by foreign sellers. Foreign suppliers are
precluded from using the same competitive tactics, like
forward pricing, as domestic suppliers.
Because of these deficiencies national antidumping laws
of some countries need revision. Dumping should be
assessed on the basis of actual price differences between
markets and not on the basis of constructed cost
measures.
Injury alone should not be a sufficient condition for
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obtaining relief from excessive imports due to dumping,
because competition usually injures some firms to the
benefit of others. Only when injury is the result of
unfair or predatory practice or has long-term
consequences for market structure, some kind or remedy is
required.
The time required to process antidumping complaints is
also causing business concern. In the USA a full year
passes from filing a complaint to the issuance of an
antidumping order. This is very long for HT industries
with their short product cycles where foreign producers
may cease dumping one product and move on to selling its
next-generation successor by the time an antidumping case
has run its course.
Therefore, fast track dumping procedures are required to
avoid that domestic suppliers are exiting production such
as in DRAMs with its delayed antidumping remedy.
Finally, antidumping duties have several shortcomings.
They do not provide compensation to the domestic
producers injured. Foreign firms guilty of dumping are
subject to no penalties beyond the duties imposed. Often
these firms increase their prices just enough to avoid
the duties. The duties collected are paid by importers,
not by foreign producers and turned over to the treasury,
not to the injured domestic producers.
Antidumping duties are a second-best solution.
The first best remedy is to offer some form of
countervailing-subsidy (CVS) or government support
program. But in the absence of first-best remedies,
antidumping provisions are often the only option
available.
Although Foreign Market Values (FMV), derived from the
fair value constructed cost concept, have been dropped
from the 1991 Semiconductor Trade Arrangement (SCTA),
Japanese producers are required to continue to collect
data in order to facilitate a fast response dumping
investigation.
7. SEMATECH.
The establishment of SEMATECH in 1987 represented a major
policy response to the decline in the US semiconductor
industry’s performance.
SEMATECH, located in Austin Texas, provides a valuable
example of the use of joint development consortia among
the American leading companies in partnership with the US
government to strengthen competitiveness.
The centralized operating entity structure contrasts with
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the "umbrella" or secretariat model used in the European
Union, where there are small administrative directorates
overseeing independent collaborative projects carried out
in-house by small groups of member firms. In Europe
programs such as ESPRIT were motivated more by broad
economic and political concerns than by industry
initiative.
SEMATECH is closer to the pattern of many Japanese
collaborative consortia with the objectives of improving
competitiveness of firms as a group.
Its goal is to bring US semiconductor manufacturing
capability to equal or exceed the world’s best, including
the design for manufacture as much as the manufacturing
process itself.
SEMATECH is not intended to manufacture any particular
product, or to develop specific processes for any
product. It is a non-profit organization that is not
permitted to sell chips.
The original mission of SEMATECH was to provide a
research facility for member firms to collaborate on
projects to improve their semiconductor manufacturing
process technology. However, within two years of
operation, the focus of the consortium changed from the
on-line testing and optimization of existing
manufacturing equipment to strengthening the
semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) industry.
This shift in the focus of Sematech was a response to the
rapidly declining competitive position of US equipment
and materials suppliers.
This was due to a failure to commit sufficient capital to
the development of next-generation equipment, a problem
exacerbated by the small size of most equipment firms and
by their notoriously poor relations with semiconductor
producers. An investment gap had emerged in the area of
next-generation manufacturing equipment.
The main focus of SEMATECH is now on the relationship
between the semiconductor and equipment industries. This
includes the development of manufacturing materials and
equipment, the integration of these into manufacturing
systems and the diffusion of best practice techniques.
SEMATECH is concerned as much with technology diffusion
as with the advancement of the technological frontier.
The largest area is equipment development, accounting for
60% of the budget. Central funding and testing can lower
the costs of equipment development and introduction by
reducing the duplication of firms’ efforts to develop and
qualify new tools.
SEMATECH also decreases the fragmentation of product
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designs and increases the supply of complementary
products and services, such as maintenance, software and
user familiarity with their operation, and so facilitates
the adoption of new processing equipment by US
semiconductor manufacturers.
Today, SEMATECH is a consortium of 11 private US
companies together with the US Department of Defense
(DOD). SEMATECH resembles an industry association,
diffusing information and best-practice techniques,
setting standards, and coordinating generic research.
Most members of SEMATECH are large corporations. But non-
members - large or small - also benefit from spillovers
from SEMATECH efforts. There are no restrictions now on
technology developed in the consortium. These spillovers
constitute a justification for government support.
US affiliates of foreign firms are not allowed to enter
SEMATECH. SEMATECH is not open to non-US firms, though
there has been some discussion with the European JESSI
program over mutual research interests. However, there
are no restrictions on joint ventures between SEMATECH
members and foreign partners.
The hypothesized advantages of collaboration in research
include the ability of participating firms to lower costs
and spread risks, reduced duplication in their R&D
investments, and the exploitation of economies of scale
in the R&D process.
However, reduced duplication of research projects also
creates a potential disadvantage. Diversity in research
projects provides an important hedge against the
possibility that any single research project will be
fruitless. Centralization of such research could lower
the productivity of an industry’s research investment.
There are concerns over appropriability and spillovers
within the consortium. Even a precommercial R&D
consortium typically involves the sharing of sensitive
information and know-how among competing firms. The fear
of knowledge spillovers may cause firms to resist
knowledge-sharing within a consortium. Defining a
consortium’s research agenda is difficult because of
appropriability concerns and divergent member firms
objectives.
Originally, the results of SEMATECH research were to be
licensed exclusively to member firms for two years and
then made available to US firms at nominal royalty rates.
Now the benefit to corporations which contribute to
SEMATECH occurs from having access to newer equipment and
processes six to nine months before they are generally
available, which may be crucial for leading-edge product
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introductions.
A main problem was that the development of advanced
manufacturing processes is crucial to the competitive
advantage of firms, but member firms are reluctant to
share such sensitive information with other members.
Moreover, there was the danger that some firms could free
ride on the contributions of the technology leaders.
Therefore, members questioned whether the development of
advanced manufacturing processes was an appropriate
objective for an industry consortium.
In response to these controversies, SEMATECH altered its
research agenda to one that sought to improve the
technological capabilities of US SMEs and to strengthen
vertical cooperation between US suppliers and US users of
semiconductor process equipment.
This may reduce the appropriability problems associated
with the original research agenda. The new research
agenda has shifted the focus from the development of a
complete state-of-the-art production process to knowledge
diffusion and technology transfer.
Three firms have withdrawn from the consortium: Micron
Technology, LSI Logic and Harris Semiconductor, because
of their dissatisfaction with the consortium’s decision
not to pursue the development of an advanced
manufacturing process that all members could apply.
SEMATECH has provided a single common qualification point
for complex production equipment, leading to a reduction
of development and qualification costs. Instead of trying
to meet the requirements of 11 different customers,
equipment suppliers can now work to a single set of
specifications.
7.1. Evaluation of SEMATECH .
Although SEMATECH remains controversial, many credit it
with saving US industry’s place in semiconductor
manufacturing. The establishment of SEMATECH has
coincided with a resurgence in the US chip industry.
In 1992, the US won a larger share of the world market
than Japan and USA firms took the leading positions in
both the chip and equipment markets.
Though much of this may be due to market dynamics beyond
SEMATECH’s influence, there seems to be widespread
recognition that it has helped with some of the
industry’s problems. However, it is difficult to separate
the influence of SEMATECH from other changes taking place
in the industry and hence to argue what would have
happened without it or what would have happened had
federal sponsorhip taken other forms.
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SEMATECH has sought to improve an area in which US
semiconductor manufacturing firms lagged behind Japanese
competitors, namely, the weakness of vertical user-
supplier relationships.
SEMATECH objectives have shifted during its existence so
that there is the issue of what targets it is evaluated
against. Although a full evaluation is some years away,
initial evidence suggests that SEMATECH has had at least
partial success in meeting its revised goal of bolstering
the capability of domestic equipment suppliers. This is
visible in a number of different areas.
1) The decline in worldwide market share of US
semiconductor equipment suppliers has essentially been
halted and has actually increased from 42.8% in 1990 to
47.1% in 1991. Several US firms increased purchases of US
equipment as a result of SEMATECH programs.
2) SEMATECH is widely credited with improving
communication within the semiconductor industry, shifting
the culture of firms toward long-term relationships and
interfirm partnerships with equipment suppliers. SEMATECH
can take credit for restoring domestic capability in
advanced lithography equipment.
3) Moreover, SEMATECH has pursued a broader agenda of R&D
funding that includes semiconductor manufacturing
technology and procedures, such as programs to develop
computer-integrated manufacturing and flexible
manufacturing systems, including process control software
and automated materials handling capability. Moreover,
SEMATECH is in a good position to define industry-wide
standards for equipment and software interface.
SEMATECH has gone some way in addressing the immediate
challenge of achieving parity with international
competitors in submicron process technology and
equipment. Nevertheless, the underinvestment by private
semiconductor firms in manufacturing equipment and
process technology remains a problem.
While the competitive position of domestic equipment
manufacturers has improved, they have not yet regained
substantial market share and the associated revenues
necessary to fund new rounds of large-scale R&D.
Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that
semiconductor firms are willing to redirect substantial
amounts of their internal R&D away from product design
and into equipment and process development.
Rather, a substantial "free rider" problem has emerged
regarding SEMATECH’s efforts to improve manufacturing
equipment. Much of the benefit of a healthy domestic
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equipment base is available to all semiconductor firms,
whether or not they are members of SEMATECH.
The key to SEMATECH’s success lies in the fact that its
goal has been relatively clear: US firms needed to catch
up in manufacturing equipment and supplier relations.
One of the most significant effects of SEMATECH is the
impact on the purchasing habits of US semiconductor
manufacturers, who have increased the amount of equipment
they buy from US suppliers, due to the increased
reliability of equipment under SEMATECH programs.
Although the improvement in performance of the US
semiconductor manufacturers may be attributable to
SEMATECH, there is little credible direct evidence that
SEMATECH is responsible for such gains.
In one important segment of the US SME industry,
lithographic "steppers", SEMATECH has not prevented
erosion in US firms’ competitiveness.
This highlights the argument that technology alone is
rarely sufficient to restore the competitiveness of firms
or industries that lack critical complementary personnel,
marketing, managerial and financial resources.
Irwin and Klenow (1994) have tried to disentangle the
effects of the consortium on US firms’ R&D spending,
profitability, investment and productivity.
They have tested two hypotheses: the "commitment"
hypothesis and the "sharing" hypothesis.
According to the commitment hypothesis SEMATECH obligates
member firms to spend more on high-spillover R&D. As
firms may be tempted to let others fund high-spillover
R&D, the 50% government subsidy is crucial. Therefore,
this hypothesis provides a rationale for the government
subsidies.
The sharing hypothesis is that SEMATECH promotes sharing
of R&D within the consortium, thereby reducing
duplicative R&D, which implies greater efficiency of
consortium R&D than of independent R&D. From a private
standpoint SEMATECH contributions are all the more
efficient because of the 50% government subsidy.
The responses from questioning alI SEMATECH members by
Irwin and Klenow appeared to be more consistent with the
sharing hypothesis, which predicts a reduction in R&D
spending, than with the commitment hypothesis, which
predicts higher R&D spending.
With respect to the effects of SEMATECH on profitability,
the commitment hypothesis implies that members’
profitability relative to non-members will rise so long
as SEMATECH R&D results do not spill over 100 percent to
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other US firms in the industry. However, the
profitability gains lag the R&D outlays by at least one
year.
Under the sharing hypothesis the jump in profitability is
equal to the fall in R&D spending due to R&D savings.
No evidence has been found that SEMATECH changed the
investment patterns in the semiconductor industry.
The results are also uninformative about whether SEMATECH
had any appreciable impact on productivity.
The principal finding has been that SEMATECH induced
members to cut their overall R&D spending providing
support for the sharing hypothesis over the commitment
hypothesis.
Most members reported positive returns on their
investments in SEMATECH, due to reductions in their
costs. SEMATECH has passed a critical market test of
viability as 11 of the original member firms thus far
have maintained their contributions, (1 percent of
semiconductor sales with a minimum of $1 million and a
maximum of $15 million).
Since SEMATECH members have become increasingly involved
in joint ventures with large foreign rivals, in May 1993
SEMATECH decided to make an exception to its policy of
restricting even indirect participation by foreign firms.
Any dramatic relaxation in this policy, such as opening
SEMATECH to membership by foreign firms, could jeopardize
future federal funding because it is pointless to provide
public funding primarily for the benefit of foreign
firms.
Although the US government supports funding for
technology development activities within the SEMATECH
consortium, it opposes technology and product development
subsidies extended by European governments to the Airbus
consortium.
The apparent inconsistencies between the US government’s
position on SEMATECH as a matter of technology policy and
its position on subsidies as a matter of trade policy
reflect broader problems of coordination between trade
and technology policies that will figure prominently in
industries other than semiconductors.
SEMATECH now focuses on technology development, rather
than fundamental research and SEMATECH’s experience shows
that consortia are likely to be most effective in
supporting the improvement and adoption of technology
rather than focusing on long-term research.
However, SEMATECH based near-term R&D cannot be a
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substitute for the scientific and technological longer-
term R&D activities performed by government, universities
and industry.
SEMATECH experience supports the importance of industry
cofunding and participation. Its research agenda has more
to do with "catching up" with global best practice than
with leading the next generation. Therefore, SEMATECH has
been a model of catch-up situations.
There is now widespread interest in the development of
collaborative research consortia in other US industries
from electric cars to high-definition television.
The economic case for federal support is strongest in
research areas characterized by high uncertainty, lengthy
time horizons, and substantial spillovers and external
effects primarily to the benefit of US firms and
taxpayers.
To the extent that SEMATECH’s research agenda is
dominated by routine equipment qualification
(demonstration of performance specifications), standard-
setting and support for suppliers’ management skills, the
case for large federal subsidies will be weakened .
The questions of how and when governments should
intervene are becoming more, not less, complex. The
growing interdependence of trade and technology policy,
and the emergence of intellectual property rights and
commercial standards are issues of central importance to
the competitive success of high-technology firms.
In an era in which technological knowledge flows rapidly
around the world, it becomes increasingly difficult to
target the support of technology in ways that primarily
benefit domestic firms and workers.
Policies that attempt to support only domestically-owned
firms may not be the best strategy for improving the
economic welfare of domestic citizens.
The key issue may be the ability of a country to capture
a large number of high-technology jobs in growing
industries, regardless of whether the employer is a
domestically-owned or a foreign-owned firm.
Rather than trying to exclude foreign firms from access
to government sponsored basic research, it will likely be
more advantageous to negotiate reciprocal access to
research sponsered by foreign consortia.
Given the strong US congressional support for SEMATECH,
it is unlikely that funding for the consortium will
actually be cut in the near term.
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However, the US government should consider the
desirability of a longer-term commitment to SEMATECH and
to the domestic semiconductor industry, support that is
not received by a multitude of other potentially worthy
industries.
Instead of bilateral negotiations, balanced trade and
sustained growth will require a multilateral framework
covering the multiple issues of market access, property
right protection and industrial policy.
8. Strategic alliances.
Over the past decade, semiconductor manufacturing has
become dominated by Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI)
technologies that combine thousands of electronic
functions at microscopic scale in a single chip. The
movement to higher levels of circuit integration, to sub-
micron fabrication, and to new Application Specific
Integrated Circuit (ASIC) and Computer Automated Design
(CAD) technologies has fundamentally altered the existing
structure of economies of scale and scope in
semiconductor manufacturing and triggered important
changes in the organizational structure of the industry.
Strategic alliances have long played a limited role in
the semiconductor industry. Since the mid-1980s, however,
the number of US - Japan alliances was increasing sharply
from the low level of activity prior to 1980. An alliance
boom in semiconductors emerged in the mid-1980s and again
in the late 1980s.
This general trend has continued to the present and the
alliances appear to become deeper and more significant in
terms of its impact on companies and the competitive
landscape.
Mass volume sales constitute the sine qua non of low-cost
production and of moving rapidly down steep learning
curves. Therefore, it is essential to find ways of
getting close to foreign customers. Because the up-front
costs and risks of breaking into foreign markets can be
prohibitively high, there are strong incentives for
companies to find foreign partners through strategic
alliances.
The key technological and manufacturing development
underlying the formation of interfirm partnerships has
been the shift to VLSI production and submicron
fabrication. This shift has led to a rapid increase in
the costs of R&D, equipment, and facilities, as well as
to an increase in the risk of market failure.
Perhaps the most obvious generic force is a trend toward
the globalization of markets. Companies cannot afford to
confine themselves to domestic markets, no matter how
large they may be.
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The twin processes of circuit integration and
miniaturization have strengthened two important
incentives for organizational change:
1) Increased pressure on firms to share the expense and
risk of rapid growing investments in R&D facilities, and
equipment.
2) The tendency toward greater design and market
specializaton.
Jointly, these two incentives explain the formation of
partnerships among firms possessing complementary
manufacturing expertise and market specialization.
In response to these developments semiconductor firms
throughout the world have formed partnerships with
producers possessing complementary marketing and
technological expertise in order to minimize the
production costs of providing new technological solutions
to diverse market segments.
Thus the motivation for forming partnerships has
increased in recent years, driven by the rising cost of
process technology and leading-edge production
facilities, the emergence of new markets for low-volume,
design-intensive devices, and the globalization of demand
for semiconductor products.
However, partnering with outside manufacturers presents
the risks of how the partner firms can avoid free-rider
problems and exercise proprietary control over the
knowledge generated by the partnership. As technologies
and ideas are transferred from one partner to another
collaborators rapidly become competitors and the alliance
collapses. The key issues for the partners are trust,
reciprocity, and forbearance. Partnerships have to be
structured so that the opportunities for and gains from
malfearance are outweighed by the benefits of continuing
the alliance.
Many partnerships involve a trade-off between short-term
gain, i.e. access to additional production capacity or
investment credit, and mid-to long-term disadvantage,
i.e., the accelerated transfer of technology.
Partnership agreements between US design houses and
foreign wafer fabrication foundries represent a
substantial proportion of the total number of strategic
alliances established during the 1980s. 80% of the
foundry work for US design houses is performed by foreign
firms, primarily Japanese and South Korean manufacturers.
The pairing of major producers in the USA and Japan
constitutes a major shift in the terms of competition and
cooperation in the semiconductor industry. The focus of
these partnerships is not so much on the transfer of
existing technologies as on the sharing of the cost of
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developing next-generation products and production
processes.
Most high-tech companies build strategic alliances in
order to:
1) compensate for in-house weaknesses or technological
gaps;
2) fill out product lines and portfolios;
3) position the company to enter lucrative new markets;
4) better serve an established or targeted customer base;
5) reduce the costs, risks, and time required to develop
new product and process technologies.
To achieve these goals, US and Japanese companies are
willing to swap technology (e.g., cross-licensing),
second source, undertake joint development projects and
organize joint ventures. The fixed costs of doing
research and of building new plant facilities have soared
to almost prohibitive heights.
The ongoing tendency of contraction in product life
cycles means that the window of opportunity for rent
retrieval has become exceedingly short.
Perhaps the key competitive requirement is achieving
economies of scale. A high production threshold must be
crossed to justify the costs of R&D and new plant
investments at a rate of around 20 to 30% per year.
Therefore, the incentives to enter into manufacturing
alliances with Japanese firms are strong.
The present partnerships are characterized by a more
balanced flow of knowledge and technology as compared to
the largely one-way flow of technology that characterized
the earlier alliances between US start-up firms and
larger Japanese manufacturers. In many cases, the
expertise of US firms in product technology is matched
with Japanese prowess in process technology and high-
volume production.
The emergence of successful global alliances has the
potential to shift competition away from the current,
predominantly nationalistic focus to a struggle among
competing global partnerships. The emerging partnerships
between US and Japanese firms will likely form the basis
for a series of global semiconductor "camps", each
centered on the process-technology capabilities of two or
three global firms linked to a multitude of smaller,
allied producers. Therefore, the primary axis of
competition will not be between the USA and Japan, but
between competing camps of global producers.
From the US perspective, small start-up firms
increasingly turn to large Japanese companies to
supplement or replace traditional sources of financing
for growth, such as venture capital.
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Linking with Japanese partners can provide American
companies access to advanced manufacturing capability and
to the rapidly growing Japanese market.
For the Japanese integrated "silicon majors" linkages
with small US firms provide access to complementary
technical capabilities that can be leveraged to gain a
stronger position in new, design-intensive semiconductor
markets as well as downstream systems.
However, the spread of alliances raises concerns as well.
The prevailing flow of semiconductor technology through
alliances is from the US to Japan. The USA is trading
product design technology for Japanese process and
manufacturing technology.
A largely one-sided outflow of technology from the US to
Japan, if continued over the 1990s, could have the
cumulative effect of eroding the foundations of America’s
capacity to innovate in the industry, with serious
consequences for the US computer and telecommunications
companies that use semiconductors. Therefore, as US
design technology leadership is the cornerstone of US
competitive advantage, this may be a risky game.
Individual US firms may have earned a steady stream of
patent revenue, but most US companies failed to
appreciate the impetus for rapid catch-up that the
transfer of technology gave to Japanese firms, which
contributed to an erosion of America’s industrial
preeminence.
US companies had reasons for selling their hard-earned
technology.
Many were preoccupied with the huge and expanding US
domestic market, which brought in profits that would
dwarf anything earned from foreign markets. Why bother
incurring the costs, risks, and uncertainties of trying
to break into what was, in the 1960s, a small and distant
Japanese market?
The far-sighted US companies which understood the long-
term importance of breaking into the Japanese market ran
into the roadblock of formal and informal barriers, which
led them to abandon or delay early plans to establish a
presence in Japan.
They concluded that earning royalties from the sale of
their technology patents was better than having nothing.
American companies have learned some hard lessons from
past experience. Today, the value of state-of-the-art
technology is recognized more clearly than it was two
decades ago. They realize that the possession of key
technologies can be converted into major gains in the
commercial marketplace.
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Therefore, many US companies have tightened up their
licensing practices, often choosing either not to license
at all or to use their patents to obtain know-how of
comparable value in return.
Crisscrossing linkages of strategic alliances now tie
together virtually all major semiconductor companies in
ever denser and more complicated networks.
It is hard to find a single significant semiconductor
company anywhere in the world today that has managed to
remain isolated from the powerful pull of alliance
linkage.
What explains the marriage of US and Japanese firms?
The most obvious explanation for the preponderance of US
-Japan alliances in semiconductors is that the US and
Japanese semiconductor industries are the biggest and
best developed in the world.
Small venture start-up firms in the US, in need of funds,
manufacturing foundries, and marketing outlets, look to
large, deep-pocketed, vertically integrated, and
diversified Japanese corporations to meet these needs.
Capital is available in the US to start new semiconductor
firms if their contribution is focused on a specific
issue in the strata of semiconductor technologies. But
capital is not available to build fully integrated firms,
and therefore alliances have become a way of life.
Many of the large Japanese giants look to small US start-
ups to provide new product designs to fill niche markets
or to compensate for certain deficiencies in their own
innovative capabilities.
In the best of circumstances, opposite firms attract and
combine in ways that overcome the respective limitations
of different systems of industrial organization (levels
of vertical integration and diversification within firms,
corporate finance, and capital markets).
Large US corporations have been less active in developing
strategic alliances with smaller US firms.
Certain features of Japanese industrial organization,
especially intercorporate shareholding, make it easier
for them to operate on the basis of a longer time horizon
than US companies, which are confronted with the tyranny
of short-term profit maximization.
Corporate shareholders in Japan, such as banks and
insurance companies, do not buy and sell their stocks in
response to short-term fluctuations in share prices. They
seek a steady appreciation of stock value through long-
term company growth.
The vast majority of US-Japan alliances are between
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small- or medium-sized US companies, (many of them young
start-ups) and large, vertically integrated, diversified
Japanese corporations, the kaisha .
These alliances transfer the bulk of American know-how to
Japan.
The primary explanation for US companies to "give away"
technology lies in the asymmetry in the size and staying
power of small US firms and of large, diversified
Japanese kaisha.
To get what the small US firms need, i.e., large
infusions of capital, manufacturing capabilities,
marketing, distribution and servicing networks in Japan,
and continual development of next generation products,
they often have to give up their only valuable assets -
marketing rights for new niche products or leading-edge
know-how.
The bargaining power of small US companies is often
limited by a strong sense of urgency occasioned by short-
term time goals and horizons.
However, even when large US corporations are involved,
fundamental deficiencies in America’s industrial base -
weaknesses in its manufacturing infrastructure, the
short-run imperatives of US capital markets, the
overreliance on the computer industry and the absence of
a substantial consumer electronics industry - have
resulted in transfers of state-of-the-art-technology to
Japanese competitors.
Japanese corporations generally find it easier to deal
with smaller US firms. Having the flexibility to pick and
choose partners based on specialized products and
technologies - what is called "boutique technology
shopping"- is an advantage compared to being locked into
deals with large US corporations.
Interesting is that there is a negative correlation
between downturns in business cycles and peak periods of
alliance formation.
When business conditons turn bearish, US companies appear
more disposed to enter strategic alliances to meet their
financing needs and to survive the sharp downturns in
demand without having to revamp existing structures. The
alternative is to cut back on R&D projects, net capital
investments and core technical personnel.
Indeed when business conditions in the semiconductor
industry slackened in 1986 and 1987, the number of
American-Japanese alliances hit a peak.
When there was a revival of demand in 1988, the number of
alliances plummeted.
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However, the situation is more complex. Factors other
than fluctuations in business demand can also have
significant effects.
In 1988 the number of US-Japan alliances fell abruptly
from 124 in 1987 to 46. This was due to the Toshiba
Machine Company incident in 1987 which involved that
company’s sale of militarily sensitive technology to the
Soviet Union. In order to avoid exposing Japanese
companies to possible foreign criticism, MITI discouraged
Japanese firms from entering strategic alliances.
In 1989 there was a surge in strategic alliances while
business demand was strong. This was due to technological
developments leading to new product clusters due to the
coming on stream of ASICs, a major new family of
products.
Another major driving force is the struggle to define and
establish broadly based standards in operating and
applications software and the choice of chips, shaped by
the rush to establish dominance in software and chip
standards.
In 1990 joint development projects represented the most
common form of strategic alliance, accounting for nearly
one quarter of the total. This type of alliance appears
to be increasing steadily over time and is likely to
continue to rise.
8.1. Diversification .
To date, Japan is one of the few advanced industrial
countries in the world in which established companies in
smokestack sectors (steel), old-line manufacfuring
(machinery, automobiles) and skilled assembly (precision
equipment) are making the transition into the high-tech
world of semiconductors and electronics.
Large Japanese steel and equipment companies ("lateral
entrants") use linkages with US companies to acquire the
critical mass of technology necessary to diversify into
semiconductors and other information industry markets.
Perhaps the most obvious reason for this diversification
is the Japanese practice of lifetime employment. When the
core business loses comparative advantage, the kaisha
begin branching out into promising new fields of business
activity.
Diversification enables them to retain their work force,
utilize sunk investments, and survive as corporate
entities.
The need to diversify has been one of the driving forces
behind a noteworthy trend in US-Japan strategic
alliances, namely, the proliferation of tie-ups between
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large Japanese corporations outside electronics and both
small and large American electronics companies.
8.2. National security concerns.
A basic problem is: What is the connection between the
commercial health of an industry such as semiconductors
and national security?
In the past national security has been defined in terms
of supply dependence and disruption. The policy solution
was to develop a safety net consisting of supply
diversification (procuring from domestic and foreign
sources, or from more than one foreign source) and
accumulating a stockpile of supplies that could be drawn
upon during emergencies.
Today it is no longer possible to cling to old concepts
of security based solely on supply disruption. It now
involves such complex issues as the commercial
competitiveness of domestic producers in key high-tech
industries, the scope of the state’s role, and coping
with the consequences of proliferating ties of economic
interdependence.
In theory, the slippery notion of economic security can
be best understood in terms of enhancing the twin
objectives of economic efficiency and adaptability. What
damages economic efficiency and adaptability is
considered to be threatening for economic security.
A fundamental question is:
To what extent is the nation’s capacity to innovate and
manufacture diminished in technologies critical to
military security?
In case a strategic alliance involves the transfer of
technology and places the capacity to innovate and to
manufacture essential weaponry at risk, then the proposed
alliance would constitute a national security question,
requiring possible public policy action.
8.3 Assessing Costs and Benefits .
In this paragraph we summarize the costs and benefits of
strategic alliances as highlighted by the National
Research Council of the USA.
Costs .
The costs of US-Japan alliances can be divided into those
incurred by the company that forms the alliance and those
incurred by industry, including the upstream and
downstream industries.
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For individual companies, perhaps the biggest potential
cost is creating a formidable competitor through
technology transfer.
For the US industry as a whole, the loss of semiconductor
manufacturing capability and infrastructure may be the
most serious potential cost.
1. Transferring Enabling Technology.
Possession of the capability to design software codes
that are embodied in advanced microprocessors, in which
area Japanese firms are still behind the US, would allow
Japanese companies to challenge US industry in its most
important stronghold and would create new competitors for
a wide range of US semiconductor companies.
However, industry trends towards open systems may reduce
the importance of proprietary microprocessing unit (MPU)
architectures. Then the lack of capability to design
superior MPUs would be less of a hurdle for Japanese
companies seeking to compete in systems markets.
2. Transferring Incremental Technology .
The costs incurred from transferring incremental
technology by developing improvements on a technology are
less severe than those incurred by transferring enabling
technology.
The case of Power Integrations is a good example of how
it is possible for US companies to control their
technology and avoid this risk. Power Integrations
structured an alliance with Matsushita for internal use
of the power management technology, but could keep
Matsushita from selling the improvements outside, as long
as the original patents remained in force.
3. Low Return on Resources Expended .
A low return on expenditures incurred by US companies
trying to break into the Japanese market is a short- and
long-term cost. In that case an alliance may be used to
enter the market and avoid enabling a long-term
competitor or avoid incurring the technology transfer-
related costs outlined above.
4. Unsuccessful Licensing Alliances .
These occur when a Japanese company uses the technology
in a way that makes the American company believe the
agreement is being violated.
Then the licensing firm regrets granting a license and
typically sues. Generally, however, US-US suits over
microprocessors appear to be more common than US-Japanese
suits. Being in a position to license and then bring suit
is preferable to not being able to enforce intellectual
property protection at all.
5. Semiconductor Specific Opportunity Costs.
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When a fabless start-up (fabless refers to companies
which do not possess their own fabrication facilities)
decides to consign manufacturing to Japanese companies
rather than build internal manufacturing capability, it
passes up experience in making devices that could bring
greater technical independence and could facilitate entry
into other product lines.
6. Foregone Synergies .
If a company would have built a semiconductor
manufacturing facility, it would have the incentive and
the capability to develop components besides
microprocessors that add value to its systems, which
would constitute a competitive advantage in the future.
Because of the American exit from much consumer
electronics manufacturing during the 1970s, the US
economy and upstream semiconductor industries have
clearly incurred long-term costs.
7. Technical Dependence.
Reliance on one supplier or small group of suppliers for
a critical component incurs the risk of supply cutoff or
price gouging.
In the short term, American systems makers are more
vulnerable in areas such as LCDs and DRAMs where US
manufacturers are weak.
In the long term, concentration of the most advanced
manufacturing capability in Japan might give Japanese
foundries more bargaining power vis à vis US companies.
8. Lost political independence .
If a US company gets involved in a US - Japan alliance it
may take a position on policy matters that it would not
otherwise take because of a desire to maintain good
relations with the Japanese partner.
In this sense, there is a risk that technical dependence
would serve to constrain the political positions taken by
US companies.
Benefits .
The benefits that accrue to US companies can be largely
characterized as access to resources and capabilities
that allow American companies to bring products to market
more quickly and effectively.
1. Capital for Survival.
Some alliances may ensure the survival of small,
financially weak US partners. However, even the deep
pockets of a Japanese partner do not always prevent
bankruptcy.
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In case a US start-up does not survive without Japanese
backing, whose products do not find a significant market,
benefits to the US industry and the economy are likely to
be minimal.
2. Leverage of Resources for Development and Growth.
The American partner in a US - Japan alliance may
leverage the Japanese capabilities to build a leading
position in a rapidly growing market.
Linkages between fabless US companies and Japanese
foundries yield these benefits when they are successful.
3. Leverage of Investment Resources .
Linking with Japanese partners sometimes helps larger US
companies leverage investment in fabrication facilities.
For the US company, the benefits of access to a world-
class fabrication facility at a cost lower than it would
have paid on its own are considerable. This increases the
viability of the US firm.
4. Leverage of Technical Resources.
American partners also benefit when Japanese companies
bring technical resources to the alliance.
5. Access to the Japanese Market .
Often it is necessary to trade technology for market
access, but a presence in the Japanese market is
increasingly essential for long-term survival and growth
in the semiconductor industry and the upstream and
downstream industries.
6. Freedom to Focus Resources on High-Return Activities.
Rather than invest in semiconductor manufacturing, the
American partner may be able to focus on building
marketing resources and on designing the next-generation
chip.
7. Organizational Learning .
The experience that the American partner gains can be
utilized in the service of long-term strategic
objectives. E.g., American telecommunications equipment
business is affected by government regulations and
knowledge of Japanese government operations and key
officials will be useful to the company.
Generalising:
The costs of US - Japan semiconductor alliances are
largely long-term, potential and difficult to quantify.
The most serious costs fall on actors and interests
external to the company forming the alliance.
The benefits are often more immediate, concrete, easy to
quantify and directly appropriable by the US company that
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forms the alliance.
Over time, the "terms of trade" in semiconductor
alliances appear to be improving for US participants.
It is now possible to gain valuable resources, such as
investment capital, access to the Japanese market, and
manufacturing services and know-how.
Strategic alliances constitute an important mechanism for
semiconductor technology transfer between the US and
Japan. They are manifestations of underlying conditions,
not the root cause of what ails the US semiconductor
industry.
8.4. Conclusions .
The world semiconductor industry will see more alliances
concluded between American and European firms, between
Asian and American companies, and between European and
Japanese corporations.
In addition to the usual bilateral alliances, the number
of trilateral and multilateral tie-ups is bound to
increase.
Linkage between the US and Japan will probably continue
to constitute the bulk of international marriages, which
will be extended by alliances with new players in
Singapore, Taiwan and Korea.
To maintain world-class competitor, the semiconductor
industry needs to maintain the full complement of
capabilities, including leading-edge R&D, fabrication,
equipment making, manufacturing, some testing and
assembly, marketing, and servicing.
The semiconductor industry cannot afford to rely
exclusively on the computer industry to drive its growth;
it must also ride the wave of growth in consumer
electronics, telecommunications, aerospace, and other
end-user industries.
Strategic alliances with Japanese companies can
contribute to the maintenance of manufacturing and
fabrication facilities and to the expansion of market
opportunities abroad.
One of the long-term objectives should be not simply the
crossing of a market share threshold in the Japanese
market but, more fundamentally, the establishment of a
permanent foothold in Japan’s industrial structure, a
breaking into the Japanese labyrinth of long-term, inter-
firm relationships.
Strategic alliances constitute perhaps the best means of
establishing a permanent foothold in the Japanese
semiconductor market. The prime objective should be to
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upgrade America’s and Europe’s manufacturing and
equipment making capabilities.
A high priority is to obtain a reverse flow of technology
in forming strategic alliances in the area of
manufacturing know-how.
Firms contemplating alliances with Japanese companies
should enter with the idea of learning as much as
possible and of effectively applying what they learn to
the development of new sources of competitive strength.
In the past, too many US firms entered with only short-
term quick-fix objectives, whereas the Japanese
approached the alliance in a spirit of moving down an
organizational learning curve and creating long-term
competitive strengths.
The role of strategic alliances has grown enormously over
the past and will continue to increase functioning as the
most important mechanism for technology transfer in the
semiconductor industry.
9. The position of Europe .
9.1. European weakness.
The semiconductor sector is the most evident area or
European weakness. European producers in 1991 held only
10% of world semiconductor production, compared to 38%
for the US and 46% for Japan.
The European producers hold less than 40% of their own
market. More than 30% of European use is supplied by
foreign companies manufacturing in Europe. The rest is
provided by imports. The trade deficit in active
components was $4 billion in 1990.
Europe does not have an entrenched position in any
segment of the sector. In DRAMs only Siemens remains in
the game. Moreover, the equipment that underlies
production is dominated by Japan and the US.
The positions shifted in favor of Japan in the 1980s and
have shifted somewhat back toward the US in the last
several years.
One area of European semiconductor strength is in
application-specific and customized chips that are
adapted to particular market needs and usually made with
processes that are not state of the art.
But the American and Japanese have established extensive
production facilities in Europe in anticipation of
political restrictions that would close the market to
them.
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European policy has made things worse because support has
gone to those activities that encourage European firms to
compete directly with American and Japanese firms in the
main industry segment and not to those that would develop
European market strength.
Overall, the European producers do not appear cost-
competitive, are generally slower and less effective at
establishing new product niches and spend less on R&D
than their Japanese competitors.
At the moment, the points of leverage and advantage in
new product lines are dominated by the Americans and the
Japanese.
The Americans create distinct product definitions, which
are often produced for them by the Japanese.
The Japanese often then produce next-generation design
improvements, which the Americans often then distribute
under their own labels.
Part of the European problem certainly lies within
European companies, that is in their limited ability to
bring new products to the market, but part also lies in
the character of the European market that the companies
are addressing.
There is seemingly little room for European companies
unless they are able to find new and innovative product
strategies.
9.2. Unsuccessful European strategy.
A European strategy, similar to the Japanese in the 1980s
was clearly unsuccessful.
The Japanese restricted FDI and used import substitution
to create and promote indigenous suppliers.
The European strategy was one of import substitution
through substituting the local production of American
companies for imports from them. In essence Europe’s
policy consisted of trading, i.e. discouraging, imports
for foreign direct investment (FDI).
The objective of the Japanese strategy was the creation
of a Japanese industry, whereas the European objective
was the establishment of a European production base,
regardless of ownership.
The Japanese strategy closed the Japanese market to
investment by American companies, reserving domestic
demand for Japanese companies and forcing US firms to
transfer technology to Japanese competitors if they
wanted to profit from growth in that market.
The European strategy allowed American companies to earn
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a rate of return by investing in Europe without
transferring technology to European competitors.
Through FDI American companies preempted the developing
European market for advanced products that European
companies could not yet supply.
Another reason for the weakness of European producers was
the fragmentation of the large European market into much
smaller national markets, which eliminated the potential
for European product specialization.
National policies discouraged cooperation between
European companies while encouraging them to cooperate
with American firms.
As a result, US companies captured the benefits of scale
that were denied to European firms.
Europe’s difficulties in semiconductors were aggravated
by the failure of a promotional policy in the computer
industry.
The basic European computer strategy was to protect
national markets with high tariff walls and to select
"national champion" firms that were given favored
treatment with direct subsidies and preferential
procurement.
This strategy was a failure.
The reasons for failure include:
* Being sheltered from competition often means lessened
pressure to stay technologically abreast in a rapidly
changing market.
* Being pushed by national policy to go head-to-head
against IBM in existing markets and applications (rather
than identifying and entering new markets) has proved
unsuccessful in the computer industry.
* Alliances to gain access to new technology with US
producers often left European partners stranded with an
installed base of orphaned technology.
The weakness of the European computer industry implied
that there was a relatively small demand there for the
high-performance state-of-the-art chips that were driving
technology development in the USA.
European chip production focused on discrete
semiconductors and ICs oriented toward the
telecommunications market.
European chip-manufacturers placed the emphasis on
servicing the needs of local equipment manufacturers
rather than competing with foreign producers in the more
rapidly developing global markets tied to the computer
industry.
The attempts to protect the European semiconductor and
computer industries from imports has created a vicious
circle.
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High tariffs and high costs for imported semiconductors
meant higher prices and diminished sales for European
computer systems makers.
Diminished computer sales meant a smaller demand for
locally produced semiconductors and this meant greater
political pressure for protection, and so on.
The solution chosen in Europe was to protect the chip
market and to permit free investment within Europe by
foreign producers in order to maintain access to leading-
edge semiconductor technology developed abroad.
The Europeans continued to target the computer industry
directly with little support for the semiconductor
industry, while the Japanese promoted the semiconductor
industry directly as a means of building strength in the
computer industry.
Only in the late 1980s Europe finally began to develop
programs to support the semiconductor producers.
9.3. European reaction to the SCTA.
Europe reacted negatively to the SCTA because of
procedureal, economic and psychological reasons.
The secret bilateral negotiation without consultation
with the EC caused procedural damage.
Europe was not consulted because the EC and USA were at
the time embroiled over agricultural trade issues and
that may have made cooperation on other issues more
difficult.
The implementation of export price "monitoring"
mechanisms by MITI designed to raise prices in third-
country markets caused economic damage.
The implicit message that Europe ceased to be an
important player in the international semiconductor
industry and could safely be ignored caused psycholo-
gical damage to Europe.
With a global market share of 10-12% European producers
were considered to be marginal players, complicating for
the Americans the already difficult bilateral talks with
Japan.
Before the SCTA Europe had access to semiconductors
without an artificial price floor.
Unhappy about having the competitiveness of their
electronics firms harmed by a price floor that the US
Department of Commerce set for Japanese chip sales to
Europe, the European Commission filed a formal complaint
with GATT.
The GATT Panel concluded that the agreement itself was
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permissible under GATT, but the way in which it was
enforced was not.
In particular the MITI monitoring of production and
export prices constituted a coherent system restricting
exports in a manner inconsistent with Article 11 (
prohibiting quantitative restrictions both on imports and
exports) so that MITI agreed to halt the monitoring of
prices to third countries in March 1989.
9.4. Forms of protection in Europe.
In February 1989, the European Commission approved a
regulation that drastically altered the rules of origin
for chips made in the EU. Although a small change, it had
very large consequences for the origin assigned to chips
produced and consumed in Europe.
Before 1989, the origin of a chip was assigned to the
country in which the last substantial process or
operation that is economically justified was performed.
In practice location of assembly and test was the de
facto standard for origin.
Under the new rule, origin is determined by the place of
fabrication, or diffusion as it has been called, (this is
the process by which electronic circuit elements are
etched on the wafer).
The major loser was Japan. About 40 percent of Japanese
companies’ sales in Europe qualified for national origin
based on the old rules, while under the new diffusion
standard only 12 percent of sales qualifies for national
origin.
American producers gained by the change because their
share in European IC sales qualifying for national origin
roughly doubled to 50 percent.
Interestingly, US chip producers, not the Japanese,
reacted most negatively to the change.
Part of the answer is that the gains were very unevenly
distributed. The big losers were Intel which had no
European manufacturing and AMD which did test and
assembly in Europe but had not invested in costly
fabrication lines. In fact some European subsidiaries of
US companies lobbied for the change in regulation.
Another reason is that the determination of origin
internationally virtually took place on the basis of the
test and assembly standard, so that the change in Europe
seemed to be an open assault on the prevailing mainstream
consensus.
The example given by the Americans of the losses suffered
was the case of a Japanese printer company, being found
guilty of dumping in the EU, that had opted not to use US
chips on its printed circuit boards because of the new
rules of origin. Japanese producers were faced with the
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requirement to use non-Japanese components, not European
components. According to the "antiscrewdriver" regulation
(designed to prevent circumvention of a dumping penalty
through the minimal performance of local assembly of
imported parts) a 40 percent minimum level of non-dumped
content was required to avoid dumping penalties.
The problem is how to decide the nationality of assembled
printed circuit boards for electronic products on which
semiconductors have been mounted and in which many parts
from many different countries have been assembled.
Two other sets of recent changes promise to create higher
walls around the European semiconductor market after
1992.
The first is a recent change in the rules for the tariff
suspension program.
The second is the price undertaking that settled the DRAM
dumping case, which will be the model for a price
undertaking to settle the EPROM dumping case.
No urgent sense of crisis seemed to mark European trade
policy in the early 1980s. Formal barriers to
semiconductor imports were relaxed a bit. In the 1980s
tariff suspensions play a significant role in IC imports.
European chip producers began asking for tariff
suspensions. For a given period, they permit non-payment
of all or some of the duties appicable to imported goods.
Goods imported under the suspension arrangement enjoy
freedom of movement throughout the Union. It allows
enterprises to obtain supplies at a lower cost for a
certain period, so that it becomes possible to stimulate
economic activity, to improve the competitive capacity
and to enable a reduction of consumer prices and to
create employment. The use of tariff suspensions became
so widespread as to effectively open the European market,
reducing the average collected duty to 5 percent of
import value and which has been a significant (though not
overwhelming) factor in lowering prices in the European
market. Some 20 percent of IC imports benefited from duty
suspensions.
Despite the increased openness of the European market,
resistance to dismantling tariff barriers lingered on. In
1985, as Japan and the USA dropped all tariffs on
semiconductors, Europe decided to lower the tariff on
semiconductors by only 3 percent to 14 percent, which is
still the ruling tariff. These apparent contradictions
probably reflected political compromises rather than a
purposeful strategy. A certain amount of de facto
liberalization was taking place as European equipment
producers, struggling to stay competitive with mounting
Asian imports, successfully lobbied for tariff
suspensions on components where domestic production was
nonexistent or technologically backward.
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The Commission Communication of September 1989 specifies
that the aims of tariff suspensions are to afford EU
producers better access to raw materials, semi-finished
goods and components that are not available in the
Communities.
Tariff suspensions have been relatively frequent in
microelectronics, accounting for some 550 cases per year
and duties forgone in the order of ECU 600 million.
Suspensions are granted mostly for one year, or in some
cases for six months. As a general rule they are not to
be prolonged systematically. Requests for the suspension
of customs duties must be submitted by firms proving that
they have unsuccesfully attempted to obtain the goods
from the main potential Union suppliers. Requests are not
considered when the amount of uncollected customs duty is
estimated to be less than ECU 20000 per year for the
whole of the Union and will be forbidden where the goods
are covered by an exclusivity agreement.
The DRAM dumping investigation instituted in early 1987
was suspended as a consequence of a price undertaking (a
confidential commitment) agreed to with Japanese
producers in August 1989. The intention of the price
floor was to provide a "safety net" for European
producers, to encourage them to increase their
investments in an environment free of fear that prices
will fall below production costs as a consequence of
cutthroat Japanese competition. A target of 20 percent of
the European market for European-based firms has been
mentioned as the desired outcome of the safety net. A
single general reference price for all imports from firms
signing the undertaking would be calculated and
communicated to the Japanese producers on a quarterly
basis. Due to pressure from European chip consumers the
undertaking set prices at relatively low levels.
The European price floors differ from the American Fair
Market Value (FMV) system. The European reference pricing
scheme includes a profit margin of 9.5 percent added on
full cost, compared wit h a 8 percent minimum profit
margin used in US-constructed cost calculations.
In this respect a distinction can be made between "hard"
dumping (selling at prices below even the most efficient
producer’s full average cost of production) and "soft"
dumping (selling at prices below one’s own cost, but not
necessarily below the cost of more efficient producers).
The American system is more stringent in that it attempts
to eliminate soft dumping, while the European system is
more liberal in that it bans only hard dumping.
However, a defender of the American system might reply
that it is more liberal because it permits efficient
producers to expand at the expense of less-efficient
producers, while the European scheme hinders even the
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most efficient exporting firm by setting a price above
its cost.
This entire discussion is moot. More important is that an
era is beginning in which different regions of the world
are setting floor prices for key semiconductors using
inconsistent and incompatible pricing formulas.
9.5. Management of dependence.
For now Europeans have not found distinctive solutions
that will allow them to capture powerful competitive
positions that can be translated into standards and
proprietary technologies that can be the base of
competitive advantage.
If a firm does not have a technology, it can develop
technology in house (hierarchies) for proprietary
technologies; buy on the open market to assure access to
commodity products; and team up with others via joint
ventures and networks for projects too expensive for
technologies not under a firm’s control.
There are no general rules that guide decisions for
companies and government when to buy or develop and on
what terms. But the objective must be access on a timely
basis on terms at least equal to one’s competitors.
If the world economy conforms to symmetrically
interdependent globalization in which technology flows
rapidly across national and regional borders, there might
no need for European electronics policies.
However, there is no guarantee that relevant technologies
will be available in a timely fashion within Europe.
Ideally it would be best to have evolving technology
close to home to profit from any spillovers. Therefore,
local technological capabilities will need to be nurtured
within Europe.
However, this is not realistic. Europe’s dilemma is that
American and Japanese firms, not indigenous European
producers are the primary source of advanced electronics
technology.
In the short term Europe cannot hope to re-create under
European control the various elements of a sophisticated
electronics supply base. Therefore, assuring leading-edge
technology becomes a matter of securing access to other
regions’ supply.
Europe must ensure that European producers have market
access to the supply bases of the US and Japan.
Diversity of supply is essential to guard against
exploitative dependency; several suppliers in at least
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two regions ought to be the policy goal.
Europe must settle for maintaining alternative regional
sources, maintaining a healthy US - Japan competition by
playing suppliers in the different regions off one
another.
The question for Europe is how it should manage this
dependence.
Should Europe accept imports to maintain lower prices,
focusing on users and emphasizing applications know-how,
while downplaying concerns about foreign supplies of
technology or should Europe restrain imports to encourage
local producers, even if that involves penalties for the
users employing the products, emphasizing the need for
intimate access to rapidly evolving cutting-edge
technology?
In the past European policies for the diffusion and use
of advanced technology never received the same attention
and weight as did producer-oriented support. The policy
debate emphasized the production of particular products,
not the broad economic gains from widespread adoption of
new technologies benefiting users.
The appropriate policy balance between emphasizing user
application and promoting directly the development of
particular products is very difficult.
The two views outlined are complements. A strong
application position can create a foundation for strength
in the production of underlying components. There must be
a balance between the two.
Strength in semiconductors often reflects the final
products and market position of the customers.
Final market position in fact creates semiconductor
strength. Final market strengths should be the basis for
formulating a strategy to induce innovation in supplier
industries.
Highly competitive electronic systems industries require
a strong semiconductor industry and a strong
semiconductor industry needs strong process equipment and
material industries.
A critical issue concerns the terms on which technologies
are available. In this respect the concept of "supply
base" may be helpful.
The supply base describes the technologies - the parts,
components, subsystems, materials and equipment
technologies - necessary for product development and
production in a range of activities and it describes
their interconnections.
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The supply base shapes the possibilities confronting
users by enabling or deterring access to appropriate
technologies in a timely fashion at a reasonable price.
The architecture of supply is a tool for helping to
determine when dependency is acceptable or dangerous.
When suppliers have the ability to exercise market power
or to act in concert to control technology flows, or when
markets and technologies are not accessible because of
protection, then the architecture of supply can
significantly constrain competitive adjustment to the
disadvantage of domestic industry.
Such an architecture is emerging today because a small
number of foreign suppliers, principally Japanese, are
more and more driving the development costs, quality and
manufacture of technological input critical to all
production.
Europe and the USA share common interests. American
suppliers now hold a larger share of the European market
than either the European or the Japanese producers.
Both want to avoid the strategic threats posed by the
market power of their Japanese competitors and they are
working together on a variety of cooperative ventures to
address these threats.
E.g., at company level the joint venture between IBM and
Siemens may be mentioned and at industry level there are
regular talks to develop common positions on trade policy
issues, such as on dumping.
Strategic alliances in R&D with US and Japanese firms may
also be an effective approach alternative to, or
complementary with, the independent EU-based development
project.
The EU realizes that nowhere is the common interest in an
open trading system more threatened than in
semiconductors, where the world seems to be sliding
rapidly toward a collection of balkanized regional
markets.
9.6. Technology policy in Europe .
A growing flow of public subsidies into joint R&D
activities in semiconductors has become increasingly
central to the European strategy for competing in
semiconductors.
The 1983 Megaproject to develop advanced semiconductor
technology played a catalytic role in the creation of the
joint European Submicron Silicon Initiative (JESSI)
launched in 1989. It was later pulled into the framework
of the pan-European Eureka R&D initiative established in
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1985 which is clearly quite a large semiconductor R&D
program.
The main purpose of JESSI was to overcome the
technological backwardness with respect to the USA and
Japan. It is too early to evaluate its effective impact
on technological and market competition in the EU because
it only finishes by the end of 1996. However, at this
moment it may already be concluded the JESSI is on the
right track and the first results have found their way to
the market place such as the wafer stepper of ASM
Lithography. It seems that JESSI contributes to the
strenghtening of the competitive position of the European
micro-electronics.
EU technology programs are generally characterized as
"pre-competitive", while Eureka technology projects have
more immediate relevance to the commercial market place.
Another initiative announced in 1984 was Esprit, directed
at the collaboration among industrial firms and the
academic community. An explicit part of the Esprit
program was the encouragement of alliances and
collaborations among European companies. EU subsidiaries
of American companies with European research facilities
have been eligible to participate. But the idea of
reciprocity in access to research programs in European
talks with the USA has become a major issue in the
semiconductor industry.
Increasingly the focus within the European semiconductor
industry is the regionalization of R&D subsidies and the
active encouragement of pan-European collaboration which
implies a shift away from competition among rival
national champions. Meanwhile, the EU is embarked on a
path toward technological integration, which means a
declining use of national R&D programs which favor
national companies.
Recently, the European Commission called for a special
consultative forum on semiconductor trade within the OECD
to establish a plurilateral agreement to achieve deeper
integration not only on trade issues, but also on policy
issues such as R&D support, procurement and FDI.
10. Recent developments and the future .
To a significant degree competitive success in
semiconductors depends upon a dynamic process of
continuous innovation, involving advances in technology,
markets and production processes.
The principal barrier to achieving this goal was the
organizational and geographical separation of innovation
and production within the US semiconductor manufacturing
systems.
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Since the mid-1980s, US semiconductor firms have taken
steps to overcome this fragmented manufacturing form,
seeking to reintegrate production into the technology-
development process.
US manufacturing performance has improved and market
share has stabilized.
The changes implemented by US semiconductor firms, in
conjunction with equipment suppliers and with the support
of SEMATECH and government programs have constituted
nothing less than a remaking of the US semiconductor
industry.
For the first time since 1985, US firms captured the
largest share of the world-wide semiconductor market. In
1992 US-based firms were responsible for 43.8% of
worldwide semiconductor shipments while Japanese firms
held a 43.1% market share.
This derives as much from weaknesses in the Japanese
economy as from refound strength in US semiconductor
manufacturing.
1) The recession in the automobile and consumer
electronics industries is a key factor in the loss of
market share by Japanese semiconductor firms, which
continue to buy most of their semiconductors from
domestic suppliers. When the recession ends, it is likely
that Japanese firms will regain much of the market share
they lost since 1992.
2) Of greater long-term concern to Japan is the loss of
market share to South Korean firms which have captured
20% of the global DRAM market, at the expense of Japanese
firms, forcing the price of DRAMs to new lows.
3) An indication of the increasing competitiveness of US
semiconductor producers is the way they have responded to
the most recent period of recession. During the past two
years Japanese firms cut back on capital investment,
while many US producers added to existing fabrication
capacity.
This will help ensure large-volume production of the
next-generation microprocessors and other design-
intensive products introduced in 1993 by US firms.
The costs of developing the factories for future
generations of memory chips are so high that companies
have begun banding together into different groups, each
to attack in its own way the enormous problems posed by
fabricating these extremely dense chips economically.
The common theme in industries from aviation, railroad
and automobiles to semiconductors, is that their initial
98
phase was dominated by efforts to improve performance and
to lower cost.
A second phase in those industries was characterized by
product refinement and diversity, what is now starting to
happen in chipmaking. Companies are shifting their use of
technology from lowering manufacturing costs to enhancing
product lines. All these industries managed to thrive in
spite of higher manufacturing costs.
It may not be long before the semiconductor industry
plateaus. The pace of transistor integration will
decline, and manufacturing costs will begin to soar. In a
more mature industry, growth will almost certainly come
from refined products in more diversified lines.
Information storage will keep moving forward. Even in the
semiconductor industry, maturity can be a splendid asset
by giving computer architectures and software time to
begin assimilating the great leaps in chip performance.
Semiconductors have been the most productivity-enhancing,
life-changing technological revolution since the
harnessing of steampower in the 18th century or, in the
19th, of electricity itself.
However, there are signs of two big changes.
1). Within the semiconductor industry itself.
The first half of the 1990s was especially lucrative;
sales in 1995 topped $155 billion. Since Christmas 1995,
however, demand has fallen below expectations.
There are grounds for expecting a big impact on the shape
of the industry. Chips have become just any other
commodity. From the point of view of national economies,
it matters little where they are made, provided that they
are available to be cheaply bought.
What matters more is how they are subsequently used.
2). For the first 20 years or so of micro-electronics,
the applications for the new technology seemed obvious.
The potential applications seemed as boundless as the
human imagination.
But the trouble is that the imagination does have bounds.
The computational power has outstripped useful
applications for it.
E.g., people are reluctant to buy Microsoft’s new
operating system, Windows 95, which requires more memory
than most home computers currently possess. And consumers
seem to have decided, for now at least, to forgo the
marginal improvement the software provides.
Moreover, the consumer-electronics industry must now
struggle to dream up new "killer applications" as
lucrative as personal stereos and video recorders.
The computer is now in the early throes of a new phase of
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its revolution, as it beomes more an instrument of
communication, less of computation.
A machine that transforms communication impinges far more
radically on people’s lives than one that transforms
computations. Why mass media, when information can be
consumed in individualised packets? It is people’s
willingness to embrace it that matters most.
In any case the semiconductor business is about to go
through a period of wrenching change.
Last year, 1995, the number of memory chips sold rose 40%
and the memory-chip business probably made profits of
nearly $30 billion on revenues of $55 billion. Some
fabrication plants have been making nearly $1 billion in
net profits each year.
More power for less money (power doubled every 18 months
and prices halved) was the combination that made
semiconductors the business.
In the early 1990s, with personal computer demand
skyrocketing and memory chips in short supply, the price
of basic chips climbed to three times their cost of
production and stayed there, defying every established
pattern.
Then, December 1995, it all started to go wrong.
First, prices started to tumble. The market price of the
most common memory chip, which had been as high as $13 in
November 1995, began dropping by more then $1 a month as
PC makers dumped excess stocks after disappointing sales
during the Christmas season. By March 1996 the price was
down to around $9.
In April 1996, things got worse. The Semiconductor
Industry Association reported that its "book-to-bill"
ratio had dropped to 0.78, its lowest point since 1985.
That meant that for every $100-worth of chips the
industry was making, shipping and billing, it was only
taking orders (bookings) for $78-worth. Since January
1996 orders were below sales.
It was the first time since 1989 that the indicator had
gone below 1.0. In February 1996 the ratio was 0.90. This
sort of slump sent businessmen to the window ledge to see
what was going on there.
Manufacturers started to postpone planned expansion. In
the past six months, the Philadelphia semiconductor
index, a measure of share prices of American chip makers,
has dropped 45%.
For users of chips the fall in chip prices must be
welcome.
However, if memory-chip prices continue to fall, the cash
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cows used to bankroll expansion into everything from PCs
and cars to aerospace will run dry and the cross-
subsidisation from semiconductors will have to stop,
which could force firms to pull back from some markets.
Therefore, to say that no one need worry about falling
semiconductor prices, is to underestimate how much a
shake-out in the chip industry would matter.
Worldwide semiconductor sales passed $150 billion in
1995, three times what they were a decade ago. By 1997,
if growth rates of 1995 were to continue, America’s chip
manufacturers would be bigger than its steel industry; by
2000, they would be as big as aerospace. By 2040 the
world’s semiconductor market would be bigger than the
world’s GDP. Upheavals in such an industry matter.
Despite current weakness in DRAMs, the world
semiconductor’s market is expected to grow at an average
rate of 20% or more for the remainder of the decade,
driven primarily by the increasing semiconductor content
in electronic end equipment and the emergence of new
markets in Asia.
There are initial signs that the market for DRAM memory
chips could remain slow for the next two years. Over
capacity is the main concern, as more fabs are coming in
line with increased supply. Memory prices and its
expectations, as forecasted by Texas Instruments, are
shown in next table.
Size 1995 1996 1997
4 MB DRAM $10 $7 $6.5
Per MB: $2.5 $1.75 $1.62
16 MB $41 $27 $19
Per MB: $2.56 $1.68 $1.18
Next reasons for the price fall may be mentioned.
All industries have downturns. But the chip market is
highly unstable, partly because there are few industries
that involve such massive fixed costs and partly because
demand for chips can change rapidly, while a new
fabrication plant can take a year or more to build.
Such long lead times mean that the supply of chips tends
to be sticky: that is, it does not adjust smoothly to
price changes or to changes in demand. Last year’s
investment in chips will produce a big extra supply just
as prices are slumping. This will push prices even lower.
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The volatilty of the chip market is compounded by
manufacturers’ high fixed costs. New fabrication plants
("fabs") can cost well over $1 billion.
State-of-the-art tech fabs become obsolete in three to
five years; staying ahead in such a business requires a
large chip maker to spend vast sums. Last year
semiconductor firms spent $30 billion on new fabrication
capacity.
To recoup its investment, a semiconductor firm will want
to run the plant as near to full capacity as possible. It
will not cut production even when demand drops, producing
a glut and even lower prices. Conversely, when demand
rises, there may be no spare capacity in existing plants,
leading to a shortage and soaring prices.
The chip business shares such characteristic market
instability with agriculture. Farming is also a business
in which supplies adjust stickily to demand because of
long lead times.
With the USA mostly out of the memory market since the
the late 1980s, and Japan restricting output to avoid
worsening the trade row, the result was another
overshoot, this time demand outstripping supply so that
prices soared. This created the artifically inflated chip
prices of the early 1990s.
South Korean firms such as Samsung and the LG (the Lucky
Goldstar) Group looked at high memory-chip prices and saw
a chance to make a killing. Last year, South Korea
overtook Japan as the largest producer of memory chips.
Chip makers are now in closer contact with their
customers than they once were. A chip maker can use
"just-in-time" manufacturing techniques to keep supplies
tied more closely to demand. Electronics firms have cut
their average chip inventory from 11 weeks in 1985 to
just 3, which should, in theory, restrain massive over-
supply.
The industry is geographically dispersed. Today, new
entrants are flooding in from Asia. And chips are now
being used in more industries than before, making
suppliers - apparently - less sensitive to any one
business.
However, these changes have not been enough to flatten
out the chip cycle. America and Japan still have nearly
80% of the world market between them. The spread of chips
into new markets is not what it seems.
Chip manufacturers still make most of their money from
just one industry: computers. Computers account for some
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60% of semiconductor revenues; mobile telephones account
for perhaps another 10%. Nothing else comes close.
Therefore, chips remain vulnerable to the fortunes of the
computer business. Both the recent slump in memory-chip
prices and the plunge in the book-to-bill ratio have
their roots in changes affecting the PC industry. Those
changes stem primarily from the rise of Microsoft, a
software company.
Last year, Microsoft released Windows 95, which needed
twice as much memory capacity. As PC users groaned under
the hype surrounding the new program, chip makers were
slavering at the thought of the extra demand it required.
But nothing happened, or not much. Companies have been
slow to buy Windows 95, partly because of associated
hardware costs, partly because it is not clear to them
how to use the extra software power, and partly because
Microsoft has another more powerful, operating system,
called Windows NT, in the wings. The result is that many
firms have decided to wait and see whether to upgrade and
do not buy in the meantime.
Another problem is the heart-stopping price of a new
fabrication plant. Chip makers are running up against the
physical limits of the technology itself.
Meanwhile the law of diminishing returns seems to be
setting in. Between 1984 and 1990, the cost of a
fabrication plant doubled but chip makers were able to
triple the performance of a chip. They are unlikely to do
as well next time. The next generation of fabs will see
costs double again by 1998, but this is likely to produce
only a 50% improvement in performance.
According to The Economist for firms there are three
alternatives.
1) Team up.
Rising costs will soon make chip manufacturing
unaffordable for single firms. Increasingly, chip makers
are sharing the costs of a new fab with customers,
competitors and even countries.
2) Subcontract manufacturing .
Fabless firms design the chips and then contract the
manufacturing out to a "foundry" (a factory without its
own design operations).
The advantage for the fabless firms is that they can get
into the chip business without having to spend billions
on manufacturing. Then, foundries face the problem of the
investment cycle, but they can mix and match customers to
help spread the risk. Fabless chip firms make up just 1%
of the market today, but are expected to have 5% by 2000.
3) Specialise.
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Separating design from production let companies exploit
technology niches while leaving the cost of manufacturing
to a contractor.
Firms that survive to produce chips in 5 or 10 years’
time are likely to have adopted one or all of these
strategies.
The immediate concern is simply to survive the next year
or two as new entrants flood into the market. Profits
that lured them into the business are no longer there.
10.1. Possible scenarios.
I. Gradual US recovery .
In this optimistic scenario, the US industry gradually
regains a market share, rising above 40% share to 45-50%
global share.
A number of conditions are attached to this possibility:
1) Declining dollar.
2) Lower interest rates.
3) Increased manufacturing investment and US industry
productivity.
4) Increased venture capital and long-term corporate
investments.
5) Better access to Japanese and Asian markets.
6) Massive global marketing efforts by US companies.
7) Design-intensive technologies increase in value.
8) Success of emerging global standards.
If these conditions improve, US companies will be under
less pressure to enter alliances.
II. Market share equilibrium .
The US market share would hover between 35 and 40%. This
requires more US effort to counterbalance a greater
mobilization of resources in Japan and Asia. Conditions
1, 2, and 4 have to show more stability. The use of Asian
fabs might expand US market share.
In this "business-as-usual" scenario, the number of US-
Japan alliances would continue at current rates and would
fluctuate with business and product cycles.
III. Gradual US decline .
The US semiconductor industry would lose a small but
significant portion of world market share to 20-25% by
2000.
This would result from next factors:
1) Stronger dollar.
2) Rising interest rates.
3) Inadequate manufacturing investment by US companies.
4) Reduced venture capital and corporate investments.
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5) Opportunity costs in Japanese and Asian markets.
6) Declining global marketing efforts by US companies.
7) Variability in value of design-intensive technologies.
8) Japanese successfully adapt to emerging global
standards.
9) Asian fab alliances falter.
IV. Japanese dominance.
The US semiconductor industry would lose 2 to 3% each
year to Japan, leading to a US share of only 10-15% in
2000.
This sharper decline would result from the same forces at
work as in the third scenario but in worse form.
Then US companies have no choice but to enter into
alliances with Japanese companies in order to secure
manufacturing, design, market access and global
marketing. Alliances emerge from weakness, not from
strategic calculations and result in accelerating
technology outflows.
V. Pacific dominance.
Japanese and Asian companies would account for 70-80% of
the world market share. American and European producers
would be relegated to minority status, with only 15 and
5% market share, respectively.
The conditions for this "doomsday" scenario are:
1) Grossly overvalued dollar.
2) Very high (15-20%) interest rates.
3) Meager manufacturing investments and sharp US
productivity setbacks.
4) Market falloff of venture capital and corporate
investments.
5) Diminished access to Japanese and Asian markets.
6) Woeful global marketing efforts by US companies.
7) Design-intensive technologies lost through alliances.
8) Japan and Asia leverage global standards.
9) Use of Japanese and Asian fabs accelerates technology
leakage and loss of US comparative advantage in
product development and standard setting.
The US would be relegated to serving as merely an R&D
laboratory for Asia and Japan, with little or no
infrastructure for mass manufacturing. The US would
become a satellite participant. There would be a massive
loss of jobs, a traumatic shake out of the semiconductor
industry’s fragmented but dynamic structure.
It may be concluded that the US semiconductor industry
today stands closest to the second scenario, an
equilibrium model. Or the US industry seems perhaps to be
headed to the gradual decline of scenario 3.
The most likely scenario for the US semiconductor
industry in the 1990s is that its market share will
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stabilize at or close to the current level.
To maintain the status quo, US companies will have to pay
greater attention to their competitive fundamentals,
including the retention of a viable manufacturing infra-
structure.
A continuation of the status quo would be less likely to
aggravate potentially volatile trade tensions.
To maintain market share two critical steps must be
taken.
1) Given the underlying structural problem of underin-
vestment in manufacturing technology and equipment, new
rounds of investment in the US are required. Continued US
government support may be required.
2) The issue of trade relations will grow in importance
in the 1990s. US-based firms must increase their share of
semiconductor shipments to Japan and other foreign mar-
kets to retain their current global market share.
Of great concern is the possibility that US industry will
undermine its ability to achieve breakthrough innovati-
ons.
In this regard there are two trends emerging in the US.
1) There are some signs that the US is cutting back its
commitment to basic research. The percentage of GNP
devoted to R&D is in 1991 lower than in Japan and Germa-
ny. Several of the major industrial R&D laboratories have
reoriented their efforts from basic to applied research.
2) There is a severe shortage of investment capital which
drives start-up firms into licensing agreements with
offshore foundries of foreign competitors. These impedi-
ments can be overcome by increasing the number of produc-
tion facilities by partnerships and joint ventures by US-
based firms.
A final prediction is that Japan will continue to fight
neck-and-neck with the USA for number one position, but
their cumulative relative weight will be progressively
reduced. The market share for Japan and North America is
expected to remain fairly constant through the rest of
the decade.
The major change will be in the relative positions of the
Asia/Pacific region and Europe.
By the start of next decade Asia/Pacific will have over-
taken Europe to become the third largest semiconductor
producer.
Europe although in fourth place, will have a bigger
market share than today, which is expected to grow to 15
percent during this decade.
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